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A New Governance Recipe for Food Safety 
Regulation 
Alexia Brunet Marks* 
Although food safety is a significant and increasing global health 
concern, international economic law does not adequately address 
today’s global food safety needs.  While most countries rely on a 
collection of formalized legal rules to protect food safety, these rules 
too often fall short.  As fiscal constraints impede raising the number of 
border inspections, formal international commitments (treaties) 
frequently limit governmental efforts to raise food safety standards.  
Private companies, meanwhile, can readily adopt higher standards to 
meet consumer demands and supply chain needs, thus demonstrating 
more nimbleness and flexibility in adopting the highest food safety 
standards available.  Can countries learn from private motivations in 
overseeing supply chains while staying true to their formal 
commitments? 
This Article documents a novel legal concept—the growing use of 
private standards to ensure food safety—reinforced by recent 
legislation in the United States and elsewhere.  While this “New 
Governance” strategy allows countries to institutionalize the types of 
steps already taken by private actors, this model is not perfect and 
additional regulatory oversight and guidance will be necessary to 
ensure that a reformed New Governance works in this context.  This 
Article confronts the motivations, tensions, and controversies that arise 
with implementing a New Governance model for food safety and 
provides a roadmap for achieving higher food safety goals. 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School.  J.D., Northwestern 
University; Ph.D., Purdue University (Agricultural Economics).  For their thoughtful comments 
on earlier drafts, I thank Keith Mazkus, Joseph Jupille, Sungjoon Cho, Gregory Shaffer, David 
Zaring, Christopher Whytock, Hannah Bauxbaum, Phil Weiser, Helen Norton, and Anna Spain, 
as well as workshop participants at the University of Colorado Institute of Behavioral Science 
Institutions Workshop, the University of Colorado Law School, the American Society of 
International Law Biennial Economic Group and Midyear Meetings, the Midwestern Law and 
Economics Association Annual Meeting, and the UC Irvine School of Law.  All mistakes are my 
own.  I welcome all comments at alexia.brunet@colorado.edu. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Guaranteeing food safety is hard, if not impossible.  Over fifty years 
ago, most farmers in the United States were small and sold goods 
locally.  As John Fagan writes, back then, “[w]hen Grandmother went 
shopping, she would look the farmer or butcher in the eye and ask, ‘Is 
this fresh and flavorful?’ . . . In that day, there was a personal basis 
upon which trust was developed between buyer and seller,”1 and the 
supplier knew that if he or she did not answer accurately, Grandmother 
would go to a different vendor next week.  This kind of trust no longer 
exists in the food industry.  Serious foodborne disease2 outbreaks have 
 
1. John Fagan, Cert ID, A Successful Example of an Independent, Third-Party, Private 
Certification System 1 (Jan. 28, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.farmfoundation.org/ 
projects/documents/fagan.pdf. 
2. Foodborne illnesses are usually infectious or toxic in nature and caused by bacteria, viruses, 
parasites, or chemical substances entering the body through contaminated food or water.  See 
Food Safety Fact Sheet No. 399, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Dec. 2015), http://www.who.int/ 
mediacentre/factsheets/fs399/en/. 
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occurred on every continent in the past decade, often exacerbated by 
increasing food supply chains, globalized trade,3 and distribution 
networks.4 
Food contamination is a realistic, ever-present risk.  If the 2008 
Chinese infant formula scandal5 taught us anything, it is that a food 
scandal can have global implications.  The food industry is the world’s 
largest industry, with numerous sectors and global production chains 
generating trillions in annual revenues.6  In 2008, as officials assured 
the American public that no Chinese manufacturers of infant formula 
were registered to sell infant formula in the United States,7 the scandal 
was wreaking havoc on many economies—affecting global contracts, 
instilling an irreversible loss of confidence for Chinese food, and 
perpetuating a general skepticism for food trade.  As supply chains 
continue to expand, concern over food safety will only intensify.  One 
commentator notes, when “more large-scale labor markets compete for 
their share of international trade, the incentives to cut corners will 
 
3. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) regulated imports have grown substantially.  In 
2009, $2 trillion in FDA-regulated products (e.g., fresh fruits and vegetables and pantry staples 
including coffee, tea, and cocoa) manufactured in more than 300,000 foreign facilities entered the 
United States from over 150 countries.  From fiscal years 2002–2010, overall U.S. food imports 
nearly doubled, and since 2000, imports of fresh fruits, vegetables, coffee, tea, and cocoa have 
more than doubled.  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT 1–4 (2012), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/aboutfda/reportsmanualsforms/reports/ucm298578.pdf. 
4. See Food Safety Fact Sheet, supra note 2 (detailing the China Infant formula scandal—
which involved infant formula contaminated with melamine and affected 300,000 infants and 
children, six of whom died, in China alone—and the 2011 E coli outbreak in Germany—which 
was linked to contaminated fenugreek sprouts (cases were reported in eight countries in Europe 
and North America), and caused $1.3 billion in losses for farmers and industries and $236 million 
in emergency aid payments to twenty-two EU member States, and led to fifty-three deaths); see 
also, World Health Org. [WHO], Food Safety: An Essential Public Health Issue for the New 
Millennium, at 9, WHO Doc. WHO/SDE/PHE/FOS/99.4 (1999), http://apps.who.int/iris/handle/ 
10665/65971 (noting that in developed and developing countries combined, contaminated food 
contributes to 1.5 billion cases of diarrhea in children each year, resulting in more than 3 million 
premature deaths).  The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), estimates that 
within the United States, foodborne diseases cause: approximately 48 million illnesses, 128,000 
hospitalizations, and 3000 annual deaths.  CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CDC 
ESTIMATES OF FOODBORNE ILLNESS IN THE UNITED STATES (2011), www.cdc.gov/foodborne 
burden/PDFs/factsheet_A_Findings_updated4-13.pdf. 
5. Mark McDonald, From Milk to Peas, a Chinese Food-Safety Mess, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 
2012), http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/21/from-milk-to-peas-a-chinese-food-safety 
-mess/?ref=topics&_r=0 (explaining that in 2008, six children died and some 300,000 fell sick 
from melamine, an industrial chemical used to make fertilizer and plastic pipe, found in Chinese- 
manufactured infant formula). 
6. IMAP, FOOD AND BEVERAGE INDUSTRY GLOBAL REPORT—2010 (2010), http://www.imap 
.com/imap/media/resources/IMAP_Food__Beverage_Report_WEB_AD6498A02CAF4.pdf. 
7. Melamine Contamination in China, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 5, 2009), 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/PublicHealthFocus/ucm179005.htm (noting 7 trillion in annual 
revenue). 
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increase and the temptation to overlook hazardous goods might become 
a more common occurrence.”8 
As countries feel pressure to raise food safety standards9 they are 
realizing that the same formal rules and practices that promise greater 
trade may, in fact, be limiting their regulatory options.10  Frequent 
“budget cuts” reduce the capacity to perform periodic inspections to 
assess compliance11 and formal international commitments (treaties) 
keep countries from setting higher-than-the-default food safety 
standards that could be perceived as protectionist.12  Current 
negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership13 
and the Trans-Pacific Partnership,14 exemplify the range of discussion 
on regulatory autonomy.  Some sources claim that the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership is watering down EU food safety 
standards, while the Trans-Pacific Partnership is suppressing the right to 
pursue regulatory goals.15 
These comments suggest that governments lack nimbleness and 
flexibility to easily adopt higher food safety standards.  In contrast, 
private companies have shown their agility to adopt higher standards to 
meet their supply chain needs.  In the last ten years, private food safety 
codes and supply chain contracts crossing international boundaries have 
proliferated, setting the stage for a transition in how food safety is 
regulated on a global scale. 
 
8. Louis Klarevas, Food: An Issue of National Security, FORBES (Oct. 25, 2008, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/2008/10/24/food-national-security-oped-cx_lk_1025klarevas.html. 
9. See generally ED RANDALL, FOOD, RISK, AND POLITICS: SCARE, SCANDAL, AND CRISIS—
INSIGHTS INTO THE RISK POLITICS OF FOOD SAFETY (2009). 
10. See generally Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International 
Regulation Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501 (2009); see also Ching-Fu Lin, Comment, SPS-Plus and Bilateral 
Treaty Network: A “Global” Solution to the Global Food-Safety Problem?, 29 WIS. INT’L L.J. 
694 (2012). 
11. See Paul Verbruggen & Tetty Havinga, Food Safety Meta-Controls in the Netherlands 6 
(Nijmegen Sociology of Law Working Paper Series, No. 2014/07, July 2014), http://www. 
researchgate.net/publication/270585728_Food_Safety_Meta-Controls_in_the_Netherlands. 
12. See Simon Lester, Talk of a ‘Right to Regulate’ is Hurting the Trade Debate, 
HUFFINGTON POST (July 21, 2015, 8:44 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/simon-lester/talk-
of-a-right-to-regula_b_7839680.html. 
13. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is in negotiation between the United 
States and Europe. 
14. The Trans-Pacific Partnership is a negotiation between the United States, Australia, 
Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. 
15. See Gabrielle Chan, Trans-Pacific Partnership Could Prevent Clearer Food Labeling—
Health Advocates, GUARDIAN (Feb. 27, 2015, 5:28 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/australia-
news/2015/feb/28/trans-pacific-partnership-could-prevent-clearer-food-labelling-health-
advocates. 
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This Article focuses on food safety, yet the discussion speaks broadly 
to policymakers in other fields wrestling with the opportunities and 
perils of using private entities to provide traditional public services.  
This Article proceeds as follows, and in so doing contributes to the 
literatures on New Governance, Transnational New Governance, and 
Global Food Safety Regulation. 
Part I presents a continuum of food safety choices available for 
country adoption.  Three choices exist—”SPS-default,” “SPS-plus,” and 
“SPS-plus plus”—all referencing the food safety standards covered 
under the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) Agreement and within it, 
the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (“SPS”) Agreement.  The SPS 
Agreement is the principal agreement under the umbrella of the WTO 
that regulates trade and indirectly, regulates food safety. The SPS 
Agreement contains rules applying to sanitary [human or animal health] 
or phytosanitary [plant health] measures, collectively “SPS measures.”  
A quick example of an SPS measure is a national rule requiring that 
certain commodity imports adhere to a minimum pesticide residue limit. 
While standards are referenced throughout the WTO Agreement, food 
safety standards are prominently noted in the SPS Agreement and for 
this reason this study focuses on the SPS.  The first standard is the 
“SPS-default,” a standard in which countries adopt the standards 
promoted by the WTO, which are the Codex Alimentarius Food Safety 
Standards (“Codex standards”), promulgated by the Codex 
Commission, a global standard-setting organization responsible for 
setting thousands of standards and guidelines to protect health and 
ensure fair trade practices.16  Conveniently, the Codex standards run 
parallel with WTO norms as codified in the WTO Agreement. The SPS 
Agreement and country adoption of the Codex standards equates to per 
se consistency with the WTO Agreement.17  
Achieving higher than the “default” standard, or standards similar to 
those found in supply chain networks, is possible in two cases.  
Countries who are privileged with the capacity to enter into 
 
16. List of Standards, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG.: CODEX ALIMENTARIUS, http://www.fao.org/fao-
who-codexalimentarius/standards/list-of-standards/en/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2016). 
17. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures art. 2, Apr. 15, 
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 [hereinafter SPS Agreement], http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal 
_e/15-sps.pdf; see also Pesticide Monitoring Program FY 2007, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodborneIllnessContaminants/Pesticides/ucm169577 (last updated 
July 17, 2015) (explaining that the SPS Agreement recognizes that 160 WTO member countries 
have the right to enact food safety measures to protect human, animal, or plant life or health, and 
requires that border measures (such as maximum residue limits or MRLs) be based on “an 
assessment appropriate to the circumstances of the risk to human and animal health”). 
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international negotiations18 can secure higher food safety standards by 
pursuing “SPS-plus” standards.  This is done through negotiating legal 
instruments that include more detailed or demanding provisions than the 
WTO or SPS Agreement, or that contain other regulatory or cooperative 
elements beyond the scope of the agreements.19  The practice of 
adopting SPS-plus standards into bilateral or regional agreements is 
sanctioned by the WTO.20 
A minority of countries—the United States, Canada, the Netherlands, 
and the United Kingdom—are adopting novel regulations that allow 
them to reach beyond those SPS-plus standards and pursue what I term 
“SPS-plus plus” standards.  This new level of standard entails country 
use of third-party certification, and other private practices found in 
supply chains, supermarket programs, grocery standards, and voluntary 
codes and guidelines,21 to achieve higher standards.  While Codex 
standards and SPS-plus standards are sanctioned by the WTO, the use 
of private standards is a controversial and currently unsettled area in 
WTO law.22 
 
18. See Gregory Shaffer, Developing Country Use of the WTO Dispute Settlement System: 
Why it Matters, the Barriers Posed, in TRADE DISPUTES AND THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
UNDERSTANDING OF THE WTO: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ASSESSMENT 167 (James C. Hartigan 
ed., 2009). 
19. See Lin, supra note 10, at 714. 
20. WTO members can enter into regional trade agreements whereby they grant more 
favorable conditions to parties to that arrangement than to other WTO members’ trade under 
specific conditions.  See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXIV, paras. 4–10, Apr. 
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT], https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/ 
analytic_index_e/gatt1994_09_e.htm; World Trade Org., The WTO’s Rules, https://www.wto.org/ 
English/tratop_e/region_e/regrul_e.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2016) (discussion of the GATT 
Enabling Clause and Article V of the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”)). 
21. RUTH KIRK-WILSON, REVIEW OF FOOD ASSURANCE SCHEMES FOR THE FOOD 
STANDARDS AGENCY (June 2002), http://www.teagasc.ie/faol/NR/rdonlyres/CDCCE03B-3C84-
4A05-8A59-D5423DACB4F5/57/UKreviewoffarmassurance.pdf (noting that since the mid-
2000s, the Food Standards Agency in the United Kingdom has promoted better food authorities 
and the activities undertaken by the private sector, mainly focusing on “farm assurance 
schemes”); see also CANADIAN FOOD INSPECTION AGENCY, INSPECTION MODERNIZATION: 
OPTIMIZING CONFIDENCE IN FOOD SAFETY—IMPROVED FOOD INSPECTION MODEL: PROPOSED 
DRAFT (2014), http://www.inspection.gc.ca/DAM/DAm-aboutcfia-sujetacia/STAGING/text-texte 
/acco_modernization_modeldraft_1344008567583_eng.pdf (announcing in 2014 that the 
Canadian Food Inspection Agency was to develop guidelines for the recognition of third-party 
service delivery providers). 
22. The issue of private standards was first raised by St. Vincent and the Grenadines who, 
concerned about the negative impact on its banana exports of EureGAP standards for pesticides, 
raised a “specific trade concern” in the WTO on this issue, followed by a SPS Committee report 
in 2007.  Note by the Secretariat, Private Standards and the SPS Agreement, WTO Doc. 
G/SPS/GEN/746 (Jan. 24, 2007) [hereinafter Private Standards]; see Submission by the World 
Organization for Animal Health, Considerations Relevant to Private Standards in the Field of 
Animal Health, Food Safety, and Animal Welfare, WTO Doc. G/SPS/GEN/822 (Feb. 25, 2008); 
15_MARKS FINAL .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/1/2016  12:58 PM 
2016] New Governance Recipe 913 
Part II argues that the evolving structure of global food production 
with multinational enterprises, supply chains,23 and different available 
standards, necessitates an evolution from traditional regulation to 
something else.24  Given current constraints on governments—financial 
constraints do not allow the U.S. government to increase border 
inspection capacity to conduct greater border inspections, and 
regulatory constraints that do not allow establishing protectionist trade 
measures—the best way to achieve higher food safety standards, SPS-
plus plus, is to adopt private sector practices such as third-party 
certification, public-private partnerships, and voluntary standards. This 
transition from overseeing all food safety functions to “co-regulating” 
might be labeled, at least by some, as a form of New Governance. 
Generally perceived as opposite to “command-and-control” 
regulation, New Governance is marked by increased collaboration of 
stakeholders and non-state actors, decentralization and devolution, 
flexibility and context specificity, and adaptability and dynamic 
learning.25  The phenomenon of New Governance refers to a regulatory 
paradigm defined by privatization, decentralization, public participation, 
horizontal coordination, experimentation, and a solution-oriented 
focus.26  And while there are numerous costs and benefits to using New 
Governance—particularly third-party certification features—anecdotal 
evidence indicates that the use of third-party certification leads to 
greater food safety transparency, cooperation and fewer food safety 
recalls.27  While these are clearly benefits, one of the most challenging 
issues, highlighted by the 2011 Colorado Listeria outbreak is the 
credibility of food safety audits and third-party certifications.28  Lytton 
 
see also STDF Information Session on Private Standards, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/private_standards_june08_e/private_standards_june08
_e.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2016); Food Safety Body Agrees to E-Working Group “Time Out” 
on Definition of Private Standards, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Mar. 26, 2015), https://www.wto.org/ 
english/news_e/news15_e/sps_26mar15_e.htm. 
23. See John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International 
Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 819, 823 (2007) (“[S]eventy-seven thousand transnational firms span 
the global economy today, with some 770,000 subsidiaries and millions of suppliers—Wal-Mart 
alone is reported to have more than sixty thousand suppliers.”). 
24. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 10, at 505. 
25. See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in 
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004). 
26. See id.; see also Amy J. Cohen, Negotiation, Meet New Governance: Interests, Skills, and 
Selves, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 503 (2008) (discussing the experimentation thread of New 
Governance). 
27. See Timothy D. Lytton & Lesley K. McAllister, Oversight in Private Food Safety 
Auditing: Addressing Auditor Conflict of Interest, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 289, 289–94 (discussing the 
role of private actors in food safety governance). 
28. In the 2011 Listeria outbreak implicating cantaloupes, a wrongful death claim was brought 
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and McAllister note the structural conflict of interest that exists when 
private auditors are paid for by the auditees—a conflict between the 
financial interest of the auditor and protecting the public from food 
safety risks.  The 2011 Colorado Listeria outbreak underscores the 
potential weakness of the New Governance framework. 
Despite its shortcomings, Part III endorses New Governance as a 
good framework for food safety.  Recent U.S. food safety legislation, 
the Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011 (“FSMA”)29—passed in 
response to growing levels of imports, diminishing resources to inspect, 
and heightened food safety risks30—adopts key New Governance 
features: third-party certification voluntary standards31 and public-
private partnerships.32  The new rules are introduced both (1) as a role 
model for emerging food safety practice, and (2) to show policymakers 
that once they can see the regulatory regime within the New 
Governance framework, certain lessons are clarified and are readily 
available for implementation.  In some cases, I show that more 
legislative authority or guidance is necessary: for example, with respect 
to conflicts of interest, third-party auditors are not prevented from 
working in-house for their clients, and auditors are not prevented from 
performing other services for their auditees; the “checklist mentality” 
should be addressed by requiring a certain number of unannounced 
visits, as is being considered by the Global Food Safety Initiative 
(“GFSI”); and auditors should be required to complete certain defined 
 
against the retailer, Wal-Mart who in turn, filed a complaint in 2014 in a Wyoming court 
asserting third-party claims against the grower (Jensen Farms), the distributor (Frontera Produce 
Ltd.) and the third-party auditors (Primus Group Inc. and Bio Food Safety Inc.).  Primus 
subcontracted Bio Food Safety to undertake the on-site audit of the cantaloupe farm, which 
resulted in a nearly perfect rating.  While this case involved an unsuccessful audit to a domestic 
producer, it revealed possible “blind spots” in the privatization of third-party certification.  Tom 
Karst, Wal-Mart Files Suit in Jensen Cantaloupe Case, PRODUCE RETAILER (Feb. 14, 2014, 5:10 
PM), http://www.produceretailer.com/produce-retailer-news/Wal-Mart-files-suit-in-Jensen-canta 
loupe-case-245591681.html. 
29. See FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA), Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 
(2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.) (amending the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301–399f)).  Third-party 
certification means that an independent organization has reviewed the manufacturing process of a 
product and has independently determined that the final product complies with specific standards 
for safety, quality, or performance.  Certified products bear the certifier’s mark on their package. 
30. See Alexia Brunet Marks, The Risks We Are Willing to Eat: Food Imports and Safety, 52 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 125 (2015). 
31. See 21 U.S.C. § 384b (2012) (explaining that for importers who want to voluntarily 
participate in the program, the Voluntary Qualified Importer Program provides for the expedited 
review and importation of food offered for importation). 
32. See id. § 381.  For a description of several voluntary system recognition agreements, see 
FDA Recognizes New Zealand as Having a Comparable Food Safety System, FDA (Dec. 13, 
2012), http://www.fda.gov/food/newsevents/constituentupdates/ucm331276.htm. 
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coursework and field training instead of fulfilling recommendations.  In 
other respects, more legislative authority is not necessary—arguably, 
the FSMA rules are appropriate with respect to the requirement to 
disclose, and managing third-party certifiers.  In essence, part of my 
contribution is using the New Governance model and literature to 
diagnose New Governance failures (e.g., 2011 Colorado Listeria) and 
provide correctives going forward.   
I.  A SMORGASBORD OF FOOD SAFETY STANDARDS 
The multitude of food safety standards can be organized along a 
continuum from default to higher standards.  This Part describes this 
continuum in ways that illustrate both the barriers that governments face 
in developing higher standards as well as the comparative flexibility 
enjoyed by private actors. 
It is useful to distinguish between two major groups of Codex 
Alimentarius Commission standards relating to food safety, numerical 
standards and process standards.33  Numerical standards are food safety 
limits that include maximum residue limits (“MRLs”) on pesticide 
residue and veterinary drug residue34 and maximum levels for 
contaminants35 and food additives.36  Codex also sets limits, or 
 
33. See Marks, supra note 30, at 152. 
34. According to the Codex Alimentarius Commission, MRLs are listed for pesticide and 
veterinary drug residues.  See CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMM’N, PROCEDURES MANUAL 24–26 
(24th ed. 2015).  Pesticides residues include: insecticides, acaricides, rodenticides, fungicides, 
herbicides, and plant growth regulators, among others.  Pesticide Residues in Food and Feed, 
FOOD & AGRIC. ORG.: CODEX ALIMENTARIUS, http://www.fao.org/fao-who-codexalimentarius/ 
standards/pestres/functional-classes/en/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).  Veterinary drug are defined 
by the Commission as “substance[s] applied or administered to any food producing animal . . . 
whether for therapeutic, prophylactic, or diagnostic purposes or for modification of physiological 
functions or behaviour.”  CODEX ALIMETARIUS COMM’N, supra, at 25. 
35. From the Codex Procedural Manual, a contaminant is 
any substance not intentionally added to food or feed for food producing animals, 
which is present in such food or feed as a result of the production (including operations 
carried out in crop husbandry, animal husbandry and veterinary medicine), 
manufacture, processing, preparation, treatment, packing, packaging, transport or 
holding of such food or feed, or as a result of environmental contamination. 
Id. at 24 (emphasis omitted).  In addition, Codex bans substances such as melamine.  See Press 
Release, World Health Org., International Experts Limit Melamine Levels in Food (July 6, 2010), 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2010/melamine_food_20100706/en/. 
36. Codex limits the definition of food additives to substances intentionally added to food for 
a technological purpose, and uses a “maximum use level” to determine the “highest concentration 
of the additive determined to be functionally effective in food or food category and agreed to be 
safe by the Codex Alimentarius Commission.”  World Health Org. [WHO],General Standard for 
Food Additives, at 2–3, Codex Stan 192 (rev. 2015), http://www.fao.org/fao-who-codex 
alimentarius/standards/gsfa/en/.  The Codex General Standard on Food Additives does not 
include food ingredients, processing aids, contaminants, pesticides, vet drugs, and nutrients. 
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microbiological criteria, for pathogenic microorganisms.37  For 
example, consider that you want to import apples from Chile.  U.S. 
Customs officials regulate fruit imports under the Food, Drug and 
Cosmetics Act of 1938, amended by the FSMA.38  Among other 
requirements, these rules specify U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency acceptable MRLs.39  The United States regulates 126 pesticides 
for U.S.-destined apples, with specific levels for each pesticide in 
question.40  These are numerical standards. 
An example of process standards is the Codex Code of Hygienic 
Practices, which stipulates elements of good practice in the management 
of all operations along the food chain and in procedures for establishing 
compliance with these operations.  For instance, foreign apple imports  
must meet U.S. agricultural production requirements calling for risk-
based preventative controls.41  The agricultural production requirements 
are process standards.  This Article presents higher standards that are 
both numerical and process in nature. 
Beyond establishing rules to ensure the safety of food imports, much 
more goes into instilling a culture of food safety.  One example of how 
a low rate of inspection instills little incentive for compliance and can 
erode a regulation and create significant food safety risk is particularly 
revealing.  A 2012 study estimating the amount of excess pesticide 
residue levels for the top twenty imported produce items (based on 
quantities imported and U.S. consumption levels) found that if the 
United States allowed the levels of those of the originating countries, 
nearly twenty thousand kilograms of pesticides in excess of U.S. 
tolerances could potentially be imported to the United States—in cases 
 
37. Under its working definition, Codex has explained a microbiological criterion as 
“defin[ing] the acceptability of a product or a food lot based on the absence or presence, or 
number of microorganisms including parasites and/or quantity of their toxins/metabolites, per 
unit(s) of mass, volume, area, or lot.”  Food & Agric. Org. [FAO], Principles and Guidelines for 
the Establishment and Application of Microbiological Criteria Related to Foods, FAO Doc. 
CAC/GL 21 (1997), www.fao.org/input/download/standards/394/CXG_021e.pdf. 
38. See FSMA, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
39. Navigating the Continuing Challenge of Pesticide MRLs, DFA CAL. (July 2015), 
http://www.dfaofca.com/issue-34-july-2015/navigating-the-continuing-challenge-of-pesticide-
mrls/ (noting the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) work with Codex to 
harmonize MRLs, from the perspective of a food sector company). 
40. The EPA establishes the list of pesticide residue limits for commodities.  40 C.F.R. § 
180.1–.6 (2015) (U.S. pesticide tolerances); 21 C.F.R. § 556.1 (2015) (U.S. veterinary drug 
tolerances); see also GLOBAL MRL DATABASE, https://www.globalmrl.com/ (last visited Mar. 
20, 2016) (providing, via subscription service, global MRLs in force for raw and processed 
commodities, among other MRL-related information). 
41. See 21 U.S.C. § 350g (2012). 
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where U.S. regulations are more protective than those of originating 
countries.42  Without proper enforcement and compliance, national rules 
cannot prevent food safety risks from entering national borders. 
Table 1 loosely depicts a continuum of food safety standards.  From 
top to bottom, the table shows minimum food safety standards moving 
toward higher food safety standards.  According to the table, “SPS-
default” or minimum standards are provided by public international 
treaties such as the WTO and Codex, while higher standards are 
available through bilateral and regional trade agreements and private 
standards.  The FSMA, which amends the Food Drug and Cosmetics 
Act of 1938, supports higher food standards, SPS-plus and SPS-plus 
plus, through the use of system recognition (bilateral) agreements (see 
infra Part I.B) and private certification. 
 
Table 1: Global Food Safety Standards Architecture 
Food Safety 
Standard 
Practices, Policies and Formal 
Commitments that Support the Standard 
1. SPS-default Multilateral Agreements: WTO and CODEX 
2. SPS-plus Bilateral Agreements and Regional Trade 
Agreements 
3. SPS-plus plus Private Standards 
 
A.  The Default Standard 
The default food safety standard, “SPS-default,” is a set of standards 
established by the Codex Alimentarius Commission and adopted by the 
WTO.  Because most countries are WTO members, most countries 
ascribe to the default rules.  
1.  The Codex Alimentarius 
Minimum, baseline standards are those set by the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission and are supported and enforced, in part, by 
the WTO.  Codex was formed in 1963 by the Food and Agriculture 
Organization and the World Health Organization of the United Nations 
to develop food standards, guidelines, and related texts such as codes of 
practice.  Under the SPS Agreement, Codex is recognized as the 
 
42. Roni A. Neff et al., A Comparative Study of Allowable Pesticide Residue Levels on 
Produce in the United States, GLOBALIZATION & HEALTH, 2012, at 8:2, http://www.globalization 
andhealth.com/content/8/1/2. 
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international standards organization for food safety.  If the United States 
adopts registration and other standards based on Codex 
recommendations, the adopted standards will be per se consistent with 
the SPS Agreement and of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(“GATT”).43  WTO members that wish to apply stricter food safety 
measures than those set by Codex are required to justify these measures 
scientifically.  While Codex recommendations are purely voluntary, 
Codex has a far reaching impact in that its 159 members cover 99% of 
the world’s population, it promulgates 336 standards and guidelines, 
and many of these standards are used to resolve trade disputes and to 
draft national legislation.44 
Most countries adopt Codex standards.  Continuing with the earlier 
example on apples, Codex sets maximum residue limits, or MRLs, for 
pesticide residue levels.  National governments often choose to 
benchmark their MRL to Codex but sometimes set their own MRLs or 
use another country’s MRLs.45  The European Union maintains its own 
set of MRL standards, which became harmonized across member states 
in 2008, while Mexico defaults to U.S. MRLs.46  Other countries, 
including Japan, Canada, Brazil, and Argentina, maintain their own 
standards.  Unless a bilateral treaty is in place with the exporting 
country, higher standards can only be adopted while considering WTO 
obligations.47  The exception is supply chains, where higher standards 
may also exist.  While collective private food standards such as 
GlobalGAP refer to prevailing Codex MRLs, they do not set additional 
requirements; private retailers do, however, set stricter standards.48  
 
43. See SPS Agreement, supra note 17, at art. 3.2. 
44. See About Codex, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG.: CODEX ALIMENTARIUS, http://www.fao.org/fao-
who-codexalimentarius/about-codex/en/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2016). 
45. See Maximum Residue Limits (MRL) Database, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.: FOREIGN AGRIC. 
SERV., http://www.fas.usda.gov/maximum-residue-limits-mrl-database (last visited Mar. 20, 
2016) (online database containing seventy country MRLs). 
46. Plants: EU Legislation on MRLs, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/ 
pesticides/max_residue_levels/eu_rules/index_en.htm (last updated Feb. 17, 2016); see also U.S. 
DEP’T AGRIC., MX5049, MEXICO’S MAXIMUM RESIDUE LIMIT (MRL) POLICY (2005), 
http://apps.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200505/146129840.pdf. 
47. The European Communities-Hormones dispute is an example of a higher standard being 
applied.  In the WTO dispute, the United States claimed that the hormone level ban imposed by 
the European Union ran counter to Codex MRL standards.  The European Union argued that 
MRL standards did not apply to the hormone in question.  Therefore, the Appellate Body of the 
WTO did not decide on MRL standards specifically, but it was raised in discussion.  Next, in the 
1990s the European Union announced to the WTO a heightened national standard with regards to 
aflotoxin.  After concern from developing countries, the European Union decided to revise the 
standard ultimately settling on the Codex standards.  See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., WRS-98–4, 
AGRICULTURE IN THE WTO (1998), http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/1774123/wrs98-4.pdf. 
48. Renata Clarke, Food & Agric. Org., Private Food Safety Standards: Their Role in Food 
15_MARKS FINAL .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/1/2016  12:58 PM 
2016] New Governance Recipe 919 
Retailers may prefer higher food safety standards for reputation, as a 
comparative advantage, or to reduce liability, among other reasons.  
Some retailers impose limits that are more stringent than national limits, 
sometimes ranging from 25%–80% of the national MRL.49  Despite 
being a fraction of the national limits, these retailer percentages are 
more stringent because farmers would rather apply more, not less, 
pesticides to eradicate pest diseases. 
2.  The WTO Agreement 
Although primarily a trade-promoting organization, the WTO also 
promotes international standards and monitors national food safety rules 
to prevent protectionism and discrimination.50  The WTO Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Agreement (“SPS Agreement”) refers to Codex standards 
as the benchmark for food safety in international trade, and calls for 
harmonization of national standards with Codex as an important 
strategy for facilitating trade.51  
The SPS Agreement was negotiated during the Uruguay Round of 
trade negotiations in 1995, when over 100 national governments signed 
the WTO agreement to prevent members from enacting food safety 
measures that act as unfair barriers to trade.52  The SPS Agreement 
recognizes that WTO member countries have the right to enact food 
safety regulations called “sanitary [human or animal health] or 
phytosanitary [plant health] measures” to the “extent necessary to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health.”53  Notably, measures are 
adopted by a government that directly or indirectly affect international 
trade, and measures are applied to protect human, animal, or plant life 
and health from a series of different risks arising from animals or plants 
or from contaminants, toxins, and additives in food.  As noted earlier 
with the apple example, a requirement to inspect for pesticide residues 
at the border is an example of an SPS measure. 
A member country needs to determine the appropriate level of 
protection that it wants to achieve (e.g., the standards it wants to 
follow); from there, each measure must follow a set of basic obligations.  
 
Safety Regulation and Their Impact 11 (2010), http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/ap236e/ 
ap236e.pdf (presenting standards for twelve private retailers). 
49. Id. 
50. See WTO, http://www.wto.org (last visited Mar. 20, 2016). 
51. See SPS Agreement, supra note 17. 
52. See SPS Agreement, supra note 17.  For an interesting discussion on how to reconcile the 
pro-health and pro-trade distinctions within the SPS agreement, see Lin, supra note 10, at 714 
n.132. 
53. SPS Agreement, supra note 17, at art. 2.2. 
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Overall, measures must not “arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate” 
against other member countries and must not operate as a “disguised 
restriction on international trade.”54  Further, SPS measures must be 
applied consistently across comparable situations to avoid “arbitrary or 
unjustifiable” levels of protection that result in “discrimination or a 
disguised restriction on international trade.”55 
Members are encouraged to harmonize SPS measures “on as wide a 
basis as possible” by utilizing “international standards” put forward by 
either Codex, the World Organization for Animal Health, the 
International Plant Protection Convention, or based on a member’s own 
risk assessment.56  An SPS measure that conforms to international 
standards enjoys a presumption of validity.57  Members are also 
encouraged to harmonize with each other’s standards by accepting as 
equivalent the SPS measures of other members, “even if these measures 
differ from their own or from those used by other [m]embers trading in 
the same product, if the exporting [m]ember objectively demonstrates to 
the importing [m]ember that its measures achieve the importing 
[m]ember’s appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection.”58 
If a member wishes to adopt an SPS measure establishing a higher 
level of protection than the international standard, it must demonstrate 
that the SPS measure is “based on” scientific evidence and bears a 
“rational relationship” between the SPS measure and the risk 
assessment itself.59  The risk-assessment process ensures that “control, 
inspection and approval procedures” do not limit arbitrarily or 
unjustifiably the importation of food.60  Finally, members should also 
consider the impact of measures on other countries by considering the 
technical and economic feasibility for the importing member, as well as 
alternative or equivalent approaches to limiting risk.61 
Members can bring WTO disputes against nonconforming measures 
and the WTO can require members who violate the SPS Agreement to 
modify or withdraw their noncompliant measures.  While the WTO 
cannot force a member government to change its measures, it has the 
 
54. Id. at art. 2.3. 
55. Id. at art. 5.5. 
56. Id. at art. 3.1, Annex A-5. 
57. Id. at arts. 2.4, 3.2. 
58. Id. at art. 4.1. 
59. Id. at art. 3.3; Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), ¶ 193, WTO Docs. WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998). 
60. SPS Agreement, supra note 17, at art. 8. 
61. Id. at arts. 2, 5, 6. 
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power to authorize those countries adversely affected to retaliate.62  
Still, WTO critics argue that, under the SPS Agreement, the “WTO may 
force a nation to choose between weakening its high standards . . . or 
paying an international penalty,”63 and “pressure for downward 
harmonization is built directly into the SPS Agreement because it is 
designed to facilitate trade, not to raise health and safety standards.”64  
This is unsurprising as members in a multilateral treaty usually concede 
to compromises around the lowest common denominator.65 
B.  Higher “Top Shelf” Standards 
Higher standards exist under two circumstances.  First, “SPS-plus” 
standards exist when countries draft a bilateral treaty or memorandum 
of understanding (“MOU”) to address specific food safety risks with 
specific countries.  Second, what I term “SPS-plus plus” standards exist 
via private standards, which have proliferated due to demand-driven 
supply-chain preferences. 
1.  Bilateral Treaties, SPS Chapters, and Memoranda of Understanding 
Governments use a variety of different approaches to address 
emerging food safety needs and their potential for enhancing food 
safety, such as: signing a bilateral treaty,66 incorporating an SPS chapter 
 
62. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE 37 (2d ed. 1999).  If the aggrieved party wins, the WTO permits the aggrieved member to 
suspend previously granted trade concessions to the violating country, typically by raising tariff 
rates on the country’s exports. 
63. See Bruce Silverglade, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: 
Weakening Food Safety Regulations to Facilitate Trade?, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 517, 517 (2000); 
see also Lydia Zuraw, Critics Say Food Safety Standards Could be Threatened by U.S./EU Trade 
Agreement, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (May 16, 2014), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2014/05/ 
food-safety-standards-could-be-threatened-in-u-s-eu-trade-agreement/#.U-gLQmPou8w (noting 
that in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, the United States and European Union 
are bargaining for strong positions with respect to agriculture).  The European Union fears 
compromising on a ban on genetically engineered crops, meat from livestock treated with non-
therapeutic antibiotics and growth hormones, ractopamine, and chemically washed poultry, plus 
standards for things such as animal welfare, organic equivalency, chemicals, and nanotechnology.  
Meanwhile, the United States fears compromising on standards for feed ingredients that include 
ruminant materials known to transmit mad cow disease; the zero-tolerance policy for Listeria and 
E. coli could be eliminated; genetically engineered labeling initiatives across the United States 
could be threatened if the European Union lowers its labeling requirements; “Buy American” 
policies could be eliminated; and Europe’s milk standards could be deemed equivalent to those of 
the United States. 
64. Silverglade, supra note 63, at 520. 
65. See Lin, supra note 10, at 729. 
66. An example is the U.S.-China Food Safety Agreement.  See Agreement Between the 
United States of America and the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and 
Quarantine of the People’s Republic of China on Food and Feed, U.S.-China, Dec. 11, 2007, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/108850.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-China Agreement]. 
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(food safety related) into a free trade agreement,67 and signing an 
MOU68 or other cooperative agreement,69 confidentiality agreement,70 
or system recognition agreement (bilateral agreements signed by 
countries with compatible food safety systems).71  All of these methods 
are housed under the bilateral agreement umbrella.   
Bilateral agreements are gaining popularity.  As of 2011, the United 
States has 110 international arrangements (104 are bilateral), at least 
fifty-six of which are directly related to food safety or SPS issues.72  
The 110 agreements include sixty-seven MOUs and other cooperative 
arrangements, and thirty-four confidentiality commitments under the 
Food and Drug Administration International Programs.73  These 
agreements could serve as models for bilateral agreements between 
trade partners to ensure the safety of food imports to the United States.74  
Countries sign bilateral agreements in an effort to reduce the cost of 
compliance in the long term and focus resources on a particular risk-
identified issue, commodity, or country.  Bilateral food safety 
agreements have been signed by the United States and China, and 
between the United States, the European Union, and Japan as pragmatic 
 
67. SPS chapters do not impose new or additional substantive rules or obligations but do 
provide a forum for the resolution of these disputes and expand the scope of SPS coverage.  In 
2009, Japan signed bilateral free trade agreements with Switzerland and Vietnam, which include 
an SPS chapter.  See WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review Report by Japan, 
WTO Doc. WT/TPR/G/243 (Jan. 11, 2011).  Leaked drafts of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade 
Globalization Agreement show that food safety is part of not one, but several conversations—
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, regulatory convergence, and supply chain management.  See 
Sharon Friel et al., A New Generation of Trade Policy: Potential Risks to Diet-Related Health 
from the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement, GLOBALIZATION & HEALTH, 2013, at 9:46, 
http://globalizationandhealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1744-8603-9-46. 
68. See Bilateral Cooperation, EURO. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumers 
_safety/international_cooperation/bilateral_cooperation/index_en.htm (last updated Feb. 10, 
2016) (discussing the Memorandum of Understanding between the European Union and China, 
which occurred on January 16, 2008). 
69. International Arrangements, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ 
InternationalPrograms/Agreements/ (last updated Nov. 24, 2015). 
70. Id. 
71. Some of these arrangements facilitate relationships and affirm participants’ commitment 
to strengthening existing scientific and public health protection activities related to food safety.  
Many are simply technical and address a narrowly defined problem or risk in a commodity 
exported from a specific country. 
72. International Arrangements, supra note 69; see also Lin, supra note 10, at 704. 
73. Lin, supra note 10, at 704. 
74. See MICHAEL T. ROBERTS, NAT’L AGRIC. L. CTR., INTRODUCTION TO FOOD LAW IN THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 13 (Nov. 2007) http://nationalaglawcenter.org/publication/ 
view/roberts-introduction-to-food-law-in-the-peoples-republic-of-china-national-aglaw-center-
publications-11-2007/.  The United States and China concluded a bilateral agreement concerning 
food safety that arose as a consequence of well-publicized problems with China food imports into 
the United States.  See U.S.-China Agreement, supra note 66. 
15_MARKS FINAL .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/1/2016  12:58 PM 
2016] New Governance Recipe 923 
approaches for imminent needs.75 
SPS-plus elements—rights and obligations that go beyond the “SPS-
default”—have emerged as a common feature of bilateral agreements.76  
According to Lin, SPS-plus refers to 
legal instruments that are signed by countries and that include more 
detailed or demanding provisions than the multilateral rules under the 
SPS Agreement, or that contain other regulatory or cooperative 
elements beyond the scope of the SPS Agreement: (1) a shift from 
response-oriented border inspection to a more prevention-based 
mechanism; (2) deeper cooperation in a more institutionalized 
apparatus; and (3) expansion in breadth and depth of information-
sharing obligations.77 
Two interesting features distinguish SPS-default protection from 
SPS-plus protection.  First, in contrast to the SPS Agreement’s default 
setting, when importing countries are responsible for implementing food 
safety border measures, regulations, and standards to protect citizens, 
exporting countries in bilateral food safety agreements absorb more of 
the responsibility and cost of ensuring food safety.78  Second, Lin notes 
that with SPS-plus, states are institutionalizing their bilateral 
cooperation.  For example, the EU-China Product Safety MOU asks the 
two sides to establish a “Joint Committee on Food Safety/SPS” and 
“Technical Working Group” to hold annual discussions on treaty 
implementation.79  These institutional developments are not part of the 
SPS-default architecture, and extend the state further into advanced 
collaboration and cooperation in food safety governance.80 
Aside from the heightened food safety protection, there are other 
benefits to signing bilateral agreements.  Bilateral agreements are 
beneficial for their information-forcing role, their ability to target 
 
75. Lin, supra note 10; see also OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2014 REPORT 
ON SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES 10 n.2, http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/ 
FINAL-2014-SPS-Report-Compiled.pdf (noting that among the U.S. free trade agreements 
(“FTA”) and trade promotion agreements (“TPA”) that include an SPS chapter are: the U.S.-
Australia FTA, the U.S.-Bahrain FTA, the U.S.-Chile FTA, the U.S.-Columbia TPA, the 
Dominican Republic-Central America-U.S. FTA (“CAFTA-DR”), the U.S.-Korea FTA, the U.S.-
Oman FTA, the U.S.-Panama TPA, and the U.S.-Peru TPA).  The U.S.-Morocco FTA does not 
have a stand-alone SPS chapter, but does include various SPS provisions in its agriculture 
chapter. 
76. See Lin, supra note 10, at 699. 
77. Id. at 714–15 (emphasis omitted). 
78. Id. at 716 (noting that the U.S.-China, EU-China, and Japan-China agreements express an 
intention to shift the burden on the exporting country by requiring registration, voluntary export 
bans, certificates, or on-site inspection). 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 717. 
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specific food safety risks, and their flexibility.  Also, given the 
compliance rate of the exporting country’s products, individual 
agreements allow for addressing specific country and commodity risks.  
Finally, individual agreements can be flexible enough to provide 
developing countries with a feasible starting point.  It has been found 
that the impact on national regulation will vary considerably, causing 
regulatory regimes to remain heterogeneous despite some 
harmonization.81  The Food and Agricultural Organization and the 
World Health Organization also recognize that food safety systems will 
differ and not every producer will have Hazard Analysis Critical 
Control Point certification.82  Given the heterogeneity of country 
capabilities, no solution will be one-size-fits-all answer.  In the end, 
bilateral agreements represent an approach to harmonize food safety one 
agreement at a time.  Importantly, for countries with similar levels of 
food safety standards, a mutual recognition or equivalence agreement 
will suffice; however, for countries with vastly differing levels of food 
safety standards, substantial tradeoffs need to be reached that could 
threaten heightened standards. 
There is evidence that signing bilateral agreements may not achieve 
higher food safety levels because they place downward pressure on food 
safety standards.  Using the Australia-U.S. free trade agreement as an 
example, before the trade talks ended, the United States deliberately 
sought changes to several critical provisions in Australia’s domestic 
food safety legislation perceived by it as limiting U.S. export capacity—
such as the use of quarantine to exclude imports that Australians 
considered safe.83  This “race to the bottom” criticism has implications 
for the numerous bilateral and regional trade agreements the United 
States has in place, and many on the horizon,84 including the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and the Trans-Pacific 
 
81. Torben M. Andersen, Niels Haldrup & Jan Rose Sorensen, Labour Market Implications of 
EU Product Market Integration, 15 ECON. POL’Y 107 (2000). 
82. Food & Agric. Org. [FAO], FAO/WHO Guidance to Governments on the Application of 
HACCP in Small and/or Less-Developed Food Businesses (2006), http://www.who.int/foodsafety 
/publications/fs_management/HACCP_SLDB.pdf. 
83. Hilary Bambrick, Trading in Food Safety?: The Impact of Trade Agreements on 
Quarantine in Australia 1 (Austl. Inst., Discussion Paper No. 73, 2004), http://www.tai.org.au/ 
documents/dp_fulltext/DP73.pdf. 
84. The United States has regional trade agreements with Canada and Mexico (NAFTA), 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua (CAFTA), and bilateral 
relationships with Jordan, Chile, and Singapore.  It is currently negotiating with the Southern 
African Customs Union (includes Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland), 
Bahrain and Morocco.  Further negotiations are planned with Thailand, Panama, Columbia, Peru, 
Bolivia, and Ecuador. 
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Partnership.85 
As noted earlier, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
and the Trans-Pacific Partnership are examples of how international 
commitments have the potential to constrain regulatory authority over 
food safety.  In recent news, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership was found to erode EU food safety standards,86 and the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership has met similar 
criticism.87  In the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the criticism lies in the 
investor-state dispute settlement mechanism pertaining to each 
agreement.  For instance, Australian citizens raised a specific concern 
after the Australian government had been trying to pass a labeling law 
requiring the display of the country of origin on the front of packaging 
after a foodborne illness outbreak from imported frozen berries.88  The 
concern is that under the Trans-Pacific Partnership, if a foreign 
company was forced to clearly label where a product was sourced and 
manufactured, and its sales dropped after the labeling was introduced, 
that company may be able to claim a loss of revenue as a result of 
Australian products being given an “unfair advantage.”89  A similar 
clause in a Hong Kong treaty allowed Philip Morris International to take 
legal action against Australia over the plain packaging tobacco laws in 
2011.90  These two cases illustrate the complicated nature of 
international commitments and the way in which they can potentially 
constrain regulatory power in the food safety arena.91 
Other indicators suggest that unilateral regulatory changes—usually 
pursued under the traditional, command-and-control paradigm—to 
 
85. See supra note 13 (the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership); supra note 14 (the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership). 
86. See Arthur Neslen, EU Dropped Pesticide Laws Due to US Pressure Over TTIP, 
Documents Reveal, GUARDIAN (May 22, 2015, 6:58 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
environment/2015/may/22/eu-dropped-pesticide-laws-due-to-us-pressure-over-ttip-documents-
reveal (noting that in negotiations, U.S. negotiators allegedly pushed the European Union to 
shelve action on endocrine-disrupting chemicals linked to cancer and male infertility to facilitate 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Protection free trade deal). 
87. See Chan, supra note 15. 
88. Terrie Morgan, Australian Food Labelling Laws: Changes and Complexities for Foreign 
Trade, BILATERALS.ORG (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.bilaterals.org/?australian-food-labelling-
laws. 
89. Id.  The language of preventing advantages can be found in the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Investment Chapter, article 9.10(2).  U.S. Trade Rep., Chapter 9: Investment, TRANS-PAC. P’SHIP 
(Nov. 5, 2015), https://medium.com/the-trans-pacific-partnership/investment-c76dbd892f3a. 
90. See Jerry Votava, Philip Morris Sues to Block New Australia Tobacco Label 
Requirements, JURIST (Nov. 21, 2011, 1:12 PM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/11/philip-
morris-sues-to-block-new-australia-tobacco-label-requirements.php. 
91. See generally Alexia Brunet Marks, The Right to Regulate (Cooperatively), 38 U. PA. J. 
INT’L L. (forthcoming 2016). 
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increase food safety may not be welcome: (1) higher national standards 
have recently been struck down by the WTO as protectionist suggesting 
a continued emphasis on scientific evidence and risk assessment to 
justify measures,92 (2) import restrictions based on foreign production 
processes have been struck down by the WTO as protectionist,93 and (3) 
developed countries are being called more frequently to defend their 
regulatory policies before arbitral tribunals in what Wagner calls an 
“investor-friendly” jurisprudence.94  This all shows that while some 
moves toward increasing food safety standards may be struck down by 
international tribunals as protectionist (e.g., WTO), others may be 
struck down as violating more arbitrary standards such as “fair and 
equitable treatment” (e.g., international investment standards). 
2.  Private Standards, Schemes, and Contracting 
Food retailers are uniquely positioned to take advantage of higher 
standards—which include stricter numerical and process standards, as 
well as product specifications, product analysis, purchasing procedures, 
internal audit, and full product or ingredient traceability—the private 
sector, out of reach of WTO and other economic law constraints. 
Generally speaking, in the food safety arena, private governance 
features developed through a series of events that include direct and 
indirect regulation.95  Private “schemes,” which include a set of 
standards plus a governance structure for certification and enforcement 
with these features—accreditation, certification, standard setting, 
adoption, implementation, conformity assessment, and enforcement96—
 
92. See Japan—Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds245_e.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2016); 
India—Measures Concerning the Importation of Certain Agricultural Products, WORLD TRADE 
ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds430_e.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 
2016); see also OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 75. 
93. See Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29/R (June 
16, 1994).  Yet, it bears mentioning that recent decisions show that there is hope for state 
regulatory space.  See Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998); see also JASON 
POTTS, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., THE LEGALITY OF PPMS UNDER THE GATT: 
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR SUSTAINABLE TRADE POLICY,. (2008), 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/ppms_gatt.pdf (summarizing current WTO law suggesting the 
expanded scope for “process and production method” regulation). 
94. See Markus Wagner, Regulatory Space in International Trade Law and International 
Investment Law, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2014). 
95. Tetty Havinga, Private Regulation of Food Safety by Supermarkets, 28 LAW & POL’Y 515, 
518 (2006). 
96. SPENCER HENSON & JOHN HUMPHREY, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., THE IMPACTS OF PRIVATE 
FOOD SAFETY STANDARDS ON THE FOOD CHAIN AND ON PUBLIC STANDARD-SETTING 
PROCESSES (2009), http://www.fao.org/3/a-i1132e.pdf. 
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emerged due to (1) a shift in regulatory responsibility for food safety 
and quality to industry, (2) the increased international sourcing of 
products, (3) heightened consumer concerns over food safety resulting 
from foodborne illness outbreaks, and (4) changing consumer attitudes 
in relation to their interest in product features beyond food safety.  The 
UK’s Food Safety Act of 1990, a product liability law which gave 
suppliers responsibility for ensuring the safety of all foods, is an 
example of indirect regulation,97 which was later adopted by the 
European Union.98  Globalization created opportunities for retailers to 
demand contracts that could increase coordination, streamline their 
operation, reduce transaction costs, and harmonize their standards.99  It 
also allowed retailers to offer foods with attributes beyond food safety 
(environmental, social, and animal welfare dimensions of food 
production processes) referred to as non-product-related production and 
process methods, which are typically discouraged by the WTO.100  It 
became clear that by virtue of WTO membership, states were unable to 
regulate non-product-related production and process methods, while 
private standards could do so.  As we shall later see, this one virtue of 
private schemes—their ability to sidestep WTO principles—cuts against 
their legitimacy.  Nevertheless, the popularity that global schemes 
gained twenty years ago continues to this day as schemes grow in 
number and membership. 
Schemes are not as visible in the United States as they are in Europe, 
where over 85% of all Western European retailers require GlobalGAP 
certification.101  Yet, scheme certification is a growing trend in the 
United States as more and more consumers are shopping in retail stores 
and expressing demand for certain product attributes.  In the United 
States, consumers spend 64% of their food dollars on supermarket 
purchases, compared to 16.3% at warehouse clubs and supercenters, 
 
97. Hugh Campbell et al., Audit Culture and the Antipodes: The Implications of EurepGAP 
for New Zealand and Australian Agri-Food Industries, in BETWEEN THE LOCAL AND THE 
GLOBAL: CONFRONTING COMPLEXITY IN THE CONTEMPORARY AGRI-FOOD SECTOR 71 (Terry 
Marsden & Jonathan Murdoch eds., 2006) (noting that section 21 of the 1990 Act provided a 
defense of due diligence where the defendant could prove that they took all reasonable 
precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid committing that offense). 
98. Id.  See generally Ladina Caduff & Thomas Bernauer, Managing Risk and Regulation in 
European Food Safety Governance, 23 REV. POL’Y RES. 153 (2006). 
99. Maki Hatanaka et al., Third-Party Certification in the Global Agrifood System, 30 FOOD 
POL’Y 354, 356 (2005). 
100. Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the 
Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525 (2004). 
101. GRACE CHIA-HUI LEE, EUR. COMM’N, PRIVATE FOOD STANDARDS AND THEIR IMPACTS 
ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 27 (2006), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/november/ 
tradoc_127969.pdf. 
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5.9% directly at farms, processors, or wholesalers, 2.9% home delivered 
or mail order, 2.7% at convenience stores, 2.3% at specialty food stores 
and the remainder in other venues.102  When consumers demand 
specific quality attributes such as organic, free range, cage free, 
hormone free, grown without pesticides, or express concerns over fair 
trade, child labor, and overexploiting natural resources, retailers respond 
by regulating their transnational suppliers,103 often requiring that their 
suppliers comply with a universally accepted auditing scheme.104  The 
auditing scheme could include, for example, firm-specific guidelines on 
suppliers’ abilities to perform a product recall or MRLs that exceed 
national standards by 25%–80%.105 
Of course, retailers may also require supplier compliance with a 
scheme for various other reasons: to increase coordination among food 
safety management activities all along the food chain, to strengthen the 
legal responsibility of food chain operators for the safety of food that 
they produce, to improve transparency and accountability for public 
food safety decision making,106 or to market their products by offering 
conformity with global standards and in a way to engage in non-price 
competition.107  For an early example of private-retailer-imposed 
certification: In 1999, Safeway, then the third largest food retailer, 
required all of their suppliers of certain commodities to verify, through 
third-party certification, that they follow Good Agricultural Practices 
for production and Good Manufacturing Practices for packinghouses for 
domestic and imported produce.108  The Safeway example is 
 
102. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOOD EXPENDITURES: TABLE 14—SALES OF FOOD AT HOME BY 
TYPE OF OUTLET (INCLUDING SALES TAX) (2016), http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/food-
expenditures.aspx. 
103. See Havinga, supra note 95, at 521 (noting that grocery retailers respond to consumer 
preferences for food safety and quality and may set more stringent standards than public 
regulators). 
104. GLOBAL FOOD SAFETY INITIATIVE [GFSI], ENHANCING FOOD SAFETY THROUGH THIRD 
PARTY CERTIFICATION (2011), http://www.mygfsi.com/gfsifiles/GFSI_White_Paper_-_Enhan 
cing_Food_Safety_Through_Third_Party_Certification.pdf. 
105. Id. at 2 (referencing the FAO Private Food Safety Standards). 
106. In the past, retailers could escape liability through contracting; however, in recent years 
this has changed.  See, e.g., Jennifer Brown, Walmart Settles with Cantaloupe Victims from 
Colorado Outbreak, DENV. POST (May 13, 2014, 5:22 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/news/ 
ci_25755216/walmart-settles-cantaloupe-victims-from-colorado-outbreak. 
107. Maki Hatanaka & Lawrence Busch, Third-Party Certification in the Global Agrifood 
System: An Objective or Socially Mediated Governance Mechanism?, 48 SOCIOLOGIA RURALIS 
73 (2008), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9523.2008.00453.x/full. 
108. Linda Calvin, Produce, Food Safety, and International Trade: Response to U.S. 
Foodborne Illness Outbreaks Associated with Imported Produce, in U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FOOD SAFETY 90 (Jean C. Buzby ed., 2004), http://www.ers.usda 
.gov/media/321547/aer828g_1_.pdf. 
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representative of the increasing phenomenon in the United States, 
European Union, and elsewhere, that each retailer has its own marketing 
channel with its own set of vendor agreements, compliance regulations, 
and costs.  This is unique in two respects.  First, unlike national 
governments, which are tied to WTO regulations and rules, retailers are 
free to draft buyer-driven requirements that can exceed national 
standards.  Second, from a sociological perspective, the growing 
influence of the private sector in food safety means that the focus on the 
state for providing food safety is no longer adequate.109 
Whole Foods Market and Wal-Mart provide other examples of 
private retail standards.  All suppliers to the Whole Foods chain must 
meet detailed standards that include: acceptable and unacceptable 
ingredients; storage and handling of products; and welfare standards for 
livestock providing meat, poultry, eggs, and dairy products.110  Another 
example is Wal-Mart’s announcement of corporate-wide efforts to have 
fresh produce suppliers follow the Produce Traceability Initiative 
Protocol and institute a “100% money back” guarantee on freshness by 
2014, with no mention of exemptions or exclusions for small farms or 
local produce.111  Unlike governments, firms do not have to be fair or 
inclusive (described infra).  For instance, standard vendor agreements 
that supermarkets use essentially serve as supplier contracts and often 
include provisions that supersede the small business exemptions 
proposed for the FSMA.112  In other words, the contracts apply to all 
suppliers regardless of their size. 
While there is wide variation in requirements among regional or 
national supermarket chains, understanding the difference between a 
standard and a scheme is fundamental to interpreting observed 
differences between Codex standards and private food safety schemes.  
As described earlier, food safety standards may be numerical (defining 
 
109. Lawrence Busch & Jim Bingen, Introduction: A New World of Standards, in 
AGRICULTURAL STANDARDS: THE SHAPE OF THE GLOBAL FOOD AND FIBER SYSTEM 11 (Jim 
Bingen & Lawrence Busch eds., 2006). 
110. WHOLE FOODS MARKET, WHOLE BODY SUPPLIER GUIDELINES, VERSION 2 (2013), 
http://www.wholefoodsmarket.com/sites/default/files/media/Global/Company%20Info/PDFs/Wh
ole_Body_Supplier_Guidelines.pdf. 
111. Rodney B. Holcomb et al., Food Safety Policies and Implications for Local Food 
Systems, 28 CHOICES, no. 4, 2013, at 1, 2, http://www.choicesmagazine.org/choices-
magazine/theme-articles/developing-local-food-systems-in-the-south/food-safety-policies-and-
implications-for-local-food-systems.  See generally WALMART, FOOD SAFETY & HEALTH, FOOD 
SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR PRODUCE SUPPLIERS (2013), http://az204679.vo.msecnd.net/ 
media/documents/food-safety-requirements-for-produce-suppliers_130042261618354678.pdf. 
112. Even with small business exemptions from the FSMA, local producers are generally 
encouraged to follow Good Agricultural Practices (“GAP”) and Good Handling Practices 
(“GHP”) protocols. 
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required characteristics of products—such as contaminant limits or 
MRLs), or process oriented (defining how the food should be produced 
including verifiable performance objectives or defining the 
requirements of the management system such as documentation 
requirements).  Supply chains may have their own standards in place, in 
the case of a supplier-buyer relationship like Wal-Mart, and this 
standard may or may not be benchmarked against a private global food 
safety scheme, which includes standards plus a governance structure for 
certification and enforcement of those standards.  That scheme could 
exceed national food safety standards.  For example, in 2008, Wal-Mart 
required retailers to provide real-time details on where suppliers fall 
short in food safety on a plant-by-plant basis,113 a process standard that 
exceeded current U.S. food safety requirements.114 
Two examples, one from a supplier perspective and one from a 
retailer perspective, illustrate how certification schemes operate.  
Assume that Honeyville Food Products, a flour manufacturer from Salt 
Lake City, Utah, wants to supply flour to Panera Bread Restaurants.  
Panera agrees, but stipulates that Honeyville must achieve Safe Quality 
Food (“SQF”) Level 2 food safety certification, a certified Hazard 
Analysis Critical Control Protection food safety plan that is 
benchmarked by the Global Food Safety Initiative, or GFSI.115  The 
 
113. In 2008, Wal-Mart became the first U.S. grocery chain requiring their factories to be 
certified against one of the internationally recognized Global Food Safety Initiative (“GFSI”) 
standards under which producers of Wal-Mart and Sam’s Club private label and other foods sold 
in the United States must be audited by independently trained, approved, and licensed auditors 
who are experts in their industry.  Press Release, Wal-Mart, Wal-Mart Becomes First Nationwide 
U.S. Grocer to Adopt Global Food Safety Initiative Standards (Feb. 4, 2008), http://news.walmart 
.com/news-archive/2008/02/04/wal-mart-becomes-first-nationwide-us-grocer-to-adopt-global-
food-safety-initiative-standards. 
114. Id.  A recent study of GFSI scheme compatibility with FSMA rules concluded that GSFI 
schemes are not only consistent with but sometimes exceed the FSMA rules.  SUPREEYA 
SANSAWAT & JIM COOK, SGS, UNDERSTANDING THE US FOOD SAFETY MODERNIZATION ACT 
(FSMA) (2013), http://www.apinews.com/en/news/item/download/1544. 
115. In many cases, customers designate a minimum level of certification.  See How to 
Achieve Certification, SQF INST., http://www.sqfi.com/suppliers/certification-steps/ (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2016).  According to the website, there are over 4500 SQF-certified suppliers in the 
United States.  Retailers that buy from certified suppliers are referred to as those that “support” 
SQF-certified-suppliers.  Examples are: Kraft Foods, Subway, Target, Hershey, McDonalds-U.S., 
Sam’s Club, and Safeway Inc.  SQF Buyer Supporters, SQF INST., http://www.sqfi.com/buyers/ 
sqf-buyer-supporters (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).  This is similar with other certifications.  For 
instance, Primus GFS is another U.S.-benchmarked scheme.  It has a long list of over 12,000 
suppliers that are certified as of May 24, 2014.  Buyers who support Primus certified suppliers 
include: Sysco Corporation, Costco Companies, Inc., Publix Super Markets, Inc., Sonic Drive In, 
Subway, and Wendy’s International, Inc.  For a detailed list of buyers, see Buyers Who Support 
Our Services, PRIMUSLABS, http://www.primuslabs.com/fsr/buyersList.aspx (last visited Mar. 20, 
2016). 
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SQF standard “creat[es] one standard for food safety from farm to 
fork.”116  To receive certification, Honeyville has to take many steps to 
ensure that it complies with the SQF standard, leading up to a third-
party facility audit from a licensed SQF-approved auditor.117   
A third-party audit is one in a series of three types of checks to ensure 
that a party complies with a standard.  A third-party auditor that 
provides certification services is known as certification body, and is 
authorized to audit against a recognized scheme through a formal 
agreement with a scheme owner combined with the scope of their 
accreditation.118  Only third-party certifiers that have been accredited by 
accreditation bodies licensed by the scheme can certify supplier 
compliance with a scheme.  Most third-party certifiers are accredited by 
an accreditation body that ensures that participating certification bodies 
in the country are subject to oversight by an authoritative body—one 
that sets standards and guidelines by which to audit companies, certify 
certification bodies to do the auditing, and continuously confirm that 
certification bodies and their employees follow the established 
standards.119  Certification bodies may be a part of many different 
accreditation bodies.120  And finally, accreditation bodies operating in 
different markets may voluntarily join “accreditor associations” and 
submit to continuous auditing by them during their membership to 
ensure consistent standards. 
Returning to the example, Honeyville uses the certification-body 
database on the SQF website to locate an SQF-approved auditor and 
hires NSF Food Safety Certification, LLC in Ann Arbor, Michigan, to 
conduct its SQF facility audit.121  If it passes the audit, Honeyville will 
be SQF-certified.  This means that Honeyville will be able to supply to 
 
116. See A Certification for Every Link in the Food Chain, SQF INST., 
http://www.sqfi.com/standards/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2016). 
117. See How to Achieve Certification, supra note 115. 
118. See SQF INST., CRITERIA FOR SQF CERTIFICATION BODIES (7th ed. 2015), 
http://www.sqfi.com/wp-content/uploads/Criteria-for-Certification-Bodies-1.16.15.pdf.  GFSI 
recognizes several schemes.  Certification bodies may be as small as a few people, while some 
are transnational and have tens of thousands of employees.  See Recognised Schemes, GFSI, 
http://www.mygfsi.com/schemes-certification/recognised-schemes.html (last visited Mar. 20, 
2016). 
119. See SQF INST., supra note 118. 
120. For example, the National Sanitation Foundation International—one of the largest 
certification bodies in the world—is accredited by the Standards Council of Canada, the United 
Kingdom Accreditation Service, and the American National Standards Institute-American Society 
for Quality National Accreditation Board. 
121. A search for SQF certifiers on the SQF website yielded thirty-five entries.  See Licensed 
Certification Bodies, SQF INST., http://www.sqfi.com/forms/membership/CertificationDirectory 
Public/searchLogos?action=Search (last visited Mar. 20, 2016). 
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any retailer, in the United States and elsewhere, that accepts the SQF 
certification. 
What if Honeyville wants to sell to a retailer in multiple markets (the 
United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom)?  Is it safe to say that 
it would face multiple scheme requirements for each market—for 
example, SQF, GlobalGAP, and British Retail Consortium (“BRC”)?  If 
so, the transaction costs to certify against multiple schemes could lead 
to audit fatigue.  Using a GFSI-benchmarked scheme eliminates this 
fatigue.  Because the SQF Level 2 certification is GFSI-benchmarked, 
Honeyville will also be able to supply to any retailer that requests SQF 
or any other GFSI-benchmarked certification.  Government 
organizations worldwide have varying standards when it comes to 
certification, and this has led to both governments and companies 
desiring a more centralized certification body.122 
GFSI emerged in 2000 as an international food safety and traceability 
benchmarking effort by food industry leaders to provide a food safety 
global certification for suppliers (“once certified, accepted 
everywhere”).123  While not a scheme itself (it does not carry out any 
certification or accreditation activities), and not a scheme-owner, GFSI 
recognizes schemes by assessing the food safety standards of the 
scheme and the governance and management structure of the food 
safety scheme owner (e.g., technical competence, safeguards against 
conflicts of interest, and procedures for accreditation bodies to oversee 
the certification bodies that audit and issue certifications under the food 
safety scheme).  GFSI-benchmarked schemes include: GlobalGAP, 
BRC, SQF1000, SQF2000, and PrimusGFS.124  The U.S.-based 
American National Standards Institute (“ANSI”) currently provides 
accreditation services for three GFSI-benchmarked food safety 
schemes: the GlobalGAP, BRC, and SQF schemes.125  This means that 
ANSI accredits third-party certifiers under these scheme standards.  For 
the supplier, certifying against a GFSI-recognized scheme means that: 
(1) it conforms to a global scheme standard, and (2) it meets 
internationally recognized minimum food safety requirements set out in 
the GFSI Guidance Document, developed by multiple stakeholders.126 
The above hypothetical featured Honeyville, an ingredient (flour) 
 
122. Hatanaka et al., supra note 99, at 358. 
123. See Recognised Schemes, supra note 118. 
124. Clarke, supra note 48, at 7. 
125. See Accreditation of Third-Party Auditors/Certification Bodies to Conduct Food Safety 
Audits and to Issue Certifications, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,782 (proposed July 29, 2013) (to be codified 
at 21 C.F.R. pts. 1, 16), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-07-29/pdf/2013-17994.pdf. 
126. See Recognised Schemes, supra note 118. 
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manufacturer, navigating SQF certification as a prerequisite to a supply 
contract with Panera, a national restaurant chain.  The example 
demonstrates how contracting with food processors, retailers, and 
foodservice entities ensures the safety of the supply chain.  The only 
downside is that requiring individual schemes may not be as efficient as 
requiring a GFSI-benchmarked scheme.  In 2008, Wal-Mart became the 
first national grocery chain to require suppliers to comply with GSFI-
benchmarked schemes.127  Prior to that point, one problem that Wal-
Mart faced, along with every other retailer and food service company, 
was sourcing from essentially the same group of suppliers, which made 
the number of food safety audit requirements unmanageable.128  Wal-
Mart found that requiring suppliers of its private label and other food 
products to become certified against GFSI standards would not only 
ensure protection and confidence in the food supply, but also would 
reduce the number of audits and associated costs incurred by the 
supplier.129  For Wal-Mart, the food safety benefits were realized two 
years later when it found, through an internal study, a 34% reduction in 
the number of recalls the company had executed across the same 
supplier base.130 
In recent years, when it comes to food safety, food processors, 
retailers, and foodservice entities have shown greater emphasis in the 
use of GFSI standards.131  Standards that combine food safety goals 
with other objectives are also popular (e.g., Kenya-GAP,132 ThaiQ, 
ChileCAP, Colombia Florverde, Ecuador’s FlorEcuador,133 Idaho 
Potatoes, and Florida Oranges), while others focus on promoting or 
rewarding sustainable or ethical business practices (e.g., IFOAM Basic 
Standard, Soil Association, East African Organic Standard, Rainforest 
Alliance, Bird-Friendly, Dolphin-Friendly, GMO-free, Conservation 
 
127. Monica Watrous, Wal-Mart’s Food Safety Efforts Yield Lower Costs, Fewer Recalls, 






131. Holcomb et al., supra note 111, at 3. 
132. See Kenya-GAP Successfully Re-benchmarked for GLOBALG.A.P. Integrated Farm 
Assurance Standard Version 4, GLOBALG.A.P. (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.globalgap.org/uk 
_en/media-events/news/articles/Kenya-GAP-Successfully-Re-benchmarked-for-GLOBALG.A.P.-
Integrated-Farm-Assurance-Standard-Version-4/.  Kenya-GAP is the only scheme in Africa that 
is benchmarked against GLOBALG.A.P. in Africa.  It promotes and ensures the implementation 
of socially and environmentally sound production and marketing practices of Kenyan retailers’ 
fresh produce. 
133. GFSI, supra note 104 (referencing FAO Private Food Safety Standards). 
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Agriculture, and FLO, for sustainability; Bio-equitable, EcoCert, and 
SA-8000, for fair trade and labor rights; Halal and Kosher, for religious 
labels; and free-range chickens and eggs, for animal welfare).134 
In what ways do these standards exceed SPS-plus standards?  All 
GFSI-recognized schemes, by their very nature, comply with the 
requirements in the Codex General Principles of Food Hygiene Code of 
Practice. Some scheme requirements exceed Codex guidelines to 
include: product specifications, product analysis, purchasing 
procedures, internal audit, and full product or ingredient traceability.135  
These additional requirements add robustness to the minimum 
requirements of food safety, and are viewed by the food industry as 
being important to food safety or, at least, highly desirable in order to 
ensure continuing compliance.136  Importantly, because most GFSI-
recognized schemes are not country-specific, schemes can sometimes 
exceed national rules.  For instance, in some respects, SQF exceeds U.S. 
FSMA rules.137 
Finally, an added benefit to schemes is that, in addition to 
establishing higher food safety standards, they are reviewed and revised 
more regularly than the Codex guidelines and, therefore, attempt to 
address issues that are currently faced by the food industry such as 
incident management, food defense, and allergen management.138 
In sum, the GFSI standard makes economic sense—the Wal-Mart 
example suggests that it is cheaper and easier to comply with one set of 
standards, rather than many.  For most retailers and producers, the GFSI 
system, and private standards that come with similar schemes, was out 
of reach before FSMA.  Imports did not need to be pre-approved for 
 
134. Id. 
135. See Recognised Schemes, supra note 118. 
136. Id. 
137. See LEAVITT PARTNERS, SQF LEVEL 2—PROPOSED PREVENTATIVE CONTROLS 
COMPARISON MODULES 2 & 11 (2013), http://www.sqfi.com/wp-content/uploads/SQF-
Preventive-Controls-Comparison-FULL-REPORT-April-2013.pdf.  SQF contracted with Leavitt 
Partners to compare the elements of SQF Level 2 (specifically Modules 2 & 11) to the FDA 
proposed requirements.  The analysis examined the two major features of the proposed FDA rule: 
the new preventive controls requirements that industries must comply with in order to implement 
the requirements of section 103 of FSMA, and the updated current Good Manufacturing Practices 
(current 21 C.F.R. pt. 110).  SQF Level 2, which focuses on food safety, is a GFSI-benchmarked 
scheme that is increasingly recognized within the food industry.  The document has a full 
comparative table.  In sum, there are several areas addressed by SQF that have not been addressed 
in the proposed rule.  Some items may be covered by existing regulations or are covered by 
FSMA and will be addressed in forthcoming regulations; however, other items were not 
contemplated or addressed by the proposed rule or other aspects of FSMA.  SQF extends beyond 
FSMA. 
138. See Recognised Schemes, supra note 118. 
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entry; foreign producers were only penalized for noncompliance with 
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) rules if their shipment failed a 
randomly assigned border inspection, post-entry.  What FSMA attempts 
to do is to certify that products are safe, pre-entry.  Only the most 
forward-looking companies sought out higher standards and requiring 
GFSI standards would not have been possible in a command-and-
control, pre-FSMA era, where regulators would have had to draft and 
enforce higher standards.  With the introduction of FSMA, regulators 
draft standards, then ask suppliers to certify against those standards (or 
higher standards) and let private bodies complete the certifications.  In 
contrast to a command-and-control economy, in this New Governance 
model, the federal government is not performing the certifications.  
While this Section focused on presenting the different regulation 
methods, from command-and-control regulation to cooperative 
regulation found in New Governance, the following Section explores 
implementing these methods. 
II.  HOW TO REACH THE “TOP SHELF” 
When considering where to set food safety standards, countries have 
a range of options.  A country chooses where it lands on the food safety 
table based on economic and political factors, which depend, in part, on 
border inspection capability and international agreements.139  Some 
countries only can follow Codex; others can do more.  Countries can 
reach for higher standards and stay within their constraints, I argue, by 
adopting New Governance strategies. 
This Article urges a transition from a global food safety regime, 
characterized by command-and-control regulation, to a new regulatory 
paradigm, with New Governance at the center of the table.  The new 
approach taken by FSMA and other countries (the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom, and Canada140) is to decentralize food safety 
regulation and collaborate with supply chains, nongovernmental 
organizations,141 and state actors.142 
 
139. See supra Table 1. 
140. See Verbruggen & Havinga, supra note 11, at 6–7 (noting that public authorities in the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Canada have recently started to develop forms of 
coordination and collaboration with private food safety control systems). 
141. The Best of Food Safety: Non-Government Organizations, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Feb. 22, 
2013), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/02/the-best-of-food-safety-non-government-organ 
izations/#.VX288If2h0A [hereinafter Food Safety] (listing leading food safety NGOs). 
142. See Lytton & McAllister, supra note 27 (mentioning no black or white dichotomy; there 
is middle ground); see also Christine Parker & John Braithwaite, Regulation, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 119 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003). 
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While New Governance is not new in other areas, it is new in the 
context of food safety.  New Governance has been successful in 
environmental law,143 occupational safety, discrimination law, and 
organizational sentencing guidelines,144 where institutional culture and 
design have a significant impact on the likelihood of deterring unlawful 
action.145  Mindful of its track record in different fields, food safety 
regulators question whether the potential for New Governance 
innovations will be offset by added challenges to an already stressed 
food safety system.146  The following Sections describe U.S. rules as 
New Governance “in action,” introduce the key drivers behind New 
Governance, and present opportunities and perils in their application. 
A.  The U.S. Example (Food Safety Modernization Act) 
The FSMA aims to increase food safety by focusing on preventing 
foodborne illness and contaminants in both domestic and imported food.  
The FSMA can be considered New Governance “in action,” because the 
proposed rules, as drafted, adopt key features of New Governance.  
Notably, FSMA’s import-safety provisions focus on leveraging: (1) the 
use of third-party certification and voluntary standards,147 and (2) 
cooperative relationships with other governments.148  Engaging private 
actors and public-private partnerships are key elements of New 
Governance understanding and food safety governance.149  I, first, turn 
to third-party certification and voluntary standards. 
As noted earlier, fifty years ago, consumers placed great trust in 
grocers and government agencies to certify that foods were safe to 
 
143. See generally Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. 129, 162–99 (2013). 
144. For a description of New Governance as applied to other legal disciplines, see Lobel, 
supra note 25. 
145. Id. at 420. 
146. See Lytton & McAllister, supra note 27, at 297–304 (discussing the problems with third-
party certification if not structured correctly). 
147. See 21 U.S.C. § 384d (2012) (requiring the Secretary to establish a system for the 
recognition of accreditation bodies that accredit third-party auditors by two years after 
enactment); see also id. § 384a (requiring the U.S. owner or consignee of an imported food at the 
time of entry to verify that the food was produced in compliance with U.S. rules and is not 
adulterated, in all likelihood requiring third-party certification); id. § 384b (providing for the 
expedited review and importation of food offered for importation by importers who have 
voluntarily agreed to participate in a program that requires certification). 
148. See FSMA, H.R. 2751, 111th Cong. § 305 (2011).  For a description of the current 
agreement with New Zealand and the pilot project with Canada, see FDA Recognizes New 
Zealand as Having a Comparable Food Safety System, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Dec. 13, 
2012), http://www.fda.gov/food/newsevents/constituentupdates/ucm331276.htm. 
149. See Lytton & McAllister, supra note 27, at 296 (discussing the role of private actors in 
food safety governance). 
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eat.150  Today, supply chains are long and diffuse and most of the 
qualities that consumers demand cannot be tested once the product has 
been placed on the grocery store shelf.  While food can be tested for 
pesticides, it is nearly impossible to discern whether a product is 
organic, if it has been made using child labor, or if the workers involved 
in the production were paid fair wages.151  From an economic 
perspective, consumers demand food safety and governments try to 
provide it.  Yet, as consumers search for a range of attributes and 
assurances, governments struggle to ensure the safety of foods coming 
from a massive and growing food industry.  Ultimately governments 
realize that they need additional resources to manage and certify the 
broad range of industries and certifications.152 
The use of third-party certification153—independent onsite auditing 
of a facility or process leading to a certification—is a rapidly growing 
private-sector practice that provides consumers with a level of trust that 
existed long ago when one purchased directly from the farmer.154  
FSMA sections 302 and 303 give the FDA authority to use certifications 
issued by accredited third-party auditors155 for two purposes.  First, 
FSMA section 302 authorizes the FDA to create Voluntary Qualified 
Importer Protection, a voluntary, fee-based program that provides for 
expedited review and importation of foods from certified facilities.156  
 
150. Hatanaka et al., supra note 99.  The first consumer protection law was passed in the 
United States in 1813, which became really enforced after Upton Sinclair’s acclaimed novel, The 
Jungle, and the resulting Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906.  See generally John P. Swann, FDA’s 
Origin, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/ 
Origin/ucm124403.htm (last updated June 23, 2014). 
151. See Friederike Albersmeier et al., The Reliability of Third-party Certification in the Food 
Chain: From Checklists to Risk-Oriented Auditing, 20 FOOD CONTROL 927 (2009). 
152. Id. 
153. See Press Release, Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of Am., Heinz to be 
Honored for Being First Company to Debut Kosher Symbol (May 25, 1999), 
https://archive.is/rNwfX (noting that the first third-party certification was the kosher label, used 
by the Orthodox Union, a non-profit organization, in 1923).  See generally TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, 
KOSHER: PRIVATE REGULATION IN THE AGE OF INDUSTRIAL FOOD (2013). 
154. See Hatanaka et al., supra note 99. 
155. The rule on accreditation of third-party auditors: “[A] third-party auditor can be a foreign 
government, an agency of a foreign government, a foreign cooperative, or any other third 
party . . . .”  Accreditation of Third-Party Auditors Certification Bodies to Conduct Food Safety 
Audits and to Issue Certifications, 80 Fed. Reg. 74,570, 74,585 (proposed Nov. 27, 2015) (to be 
codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 1, 11 &16).  It must also meet standards for “legal authority, 
competency, capacity, conflicts of interest, quality assurance, and records.”  See id. at 74,586. 
156. See 21 U.S.C. § 384b (2012) (providing “for the expedited review and importation of 
food offered for importation by importers who have voluntarily agreed to participate in such 
program”); see also id. § 381(a) (providing that the Secretary of the Treasury must deliver to the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services samples of food, drugs, devices, tobacco products, and 
cosmetics that are being imported or offered for import into the United States). 
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This program is designed for importers who achieve and maintain a 
high level of control over the safety and security of their supply 
chains.157  Second, FSMA section 303 gives the FDA authority to 
require that high-risk imported foods be accompanied by a credible 
third-party certification or other assurance of compliance as a condition 
of entry into the United States.158 
While these two rules require onsite audits performed by a qualified 
third-party auditor, other rules are likely to accept third-party audits for 
verification purposes.  The Foreign Supplier Verification Program 
(“FSVP”), for instance, requires importers to perform risk-based, 
foreign-supplier verification activities to ensure that foreign suppliers 
have adequate preventive controls in place.159  Although the FSVP 
proposal does not require the use of accredited third-party auditors, the 
FDA anticipates that once the FDA accreditation system is in place, 
importers may increasingly rely on audits by accredited third parties to 
meet their supplier verification requirements under FSVP.160  
Interestingly, food producers have sought out higher standards for 
imports, showing how supply chains influenced FSMA.161  All versions 
 
157. See id. § 384d; see also New FDA Program Will Benefit Both Importers and Consumers, 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (June 4, 2015), http://www.fda.gov/Food/NewsEvents/Constituent 
Updates/ucm448567.htm (noting that the program is expected to be open for applications in 
January 2018 to allow enough time for a facility to be certified under the FDA’s Accredited 
Third-Party Certification program). 
158. See 21 U.S.C. § 381(a). 
159. See id. § 384a (stating verification activities under this program may include: monitoring 
records for shipments; lot-by-lot certification of compliance; annual on-site inspections; checking 
the hazard analysis and risk-based preventive control plan of the foreign supplier; and testing and 
sampling). 
160. Accreditation of Third-Party Auditors Certification Bodies to Conduct Food Safety 
Audits and to Issue Certifications, 80 Fed. Reg. 74,570, 74,585 (proposed Nov. 27, 2015) (to be 
codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 1, 11 &16). 
161. See FSMA Final Rule on Foreign Supplier Verification Programs (FSVP) for Importers 
of Food for Humans and Animals, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Food/ 
GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/ucm361902.htm (last updated Feb. 25, 2016) (noting that the 
revisions that the FDA proposed included providing importers the flexibility to determine 
appropriate verification measures based on food and supplier risks, while acknowledging the 
greater risk to public health posed by the most serious hazards in foods).  Regarding the 
requirements for supplier verification activities, the FDA suggests: 
When there is reason to believe that a hazard in a food that will be controlled by the 
foreign supplier is one for which there is a reasonable probability that it will cause 
serious adverse health consequences or deaths, a clear, rigorous verification standard is 
required in the form of annual on-site auditing of the supplier.  However, importers 
have the flexibility to use a different approach if they can establish that it will be 
appropriate to provide adequate assurance that the foreign supplier is significantly 
minimizing or preventing the hazard. 
Frequently Asked Questions on FSMA, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Food/ 
GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/ucm247559.htm (last updated Feb. 19, 2016). 
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of the rule contain language that the FDA carefully considered using 
Codex guidelines on food import control systems on the use of third-
party auditing for food safety: 
In describing the general characteristics of food import control 
systems, the Guidelines for Food Import Control Systems developed 
by the Codex Committee on Food Import and Export Inspection and 
Certification Systems recognize a number of related concepts, 
including: that countries can set their own appropriate levels of 
protection; that standards should be based on risk and, as far as 
possible, applied equally to imported and domestic food; that there is a 
potential need for different approaches to compliance monitoring of 
domestic and imported food to ensure consistent levels of protection; 
and that there is utility in conducting audits, along with using other 
tools, in addition to assessing importer controls to ensure that 
imported foods are safe, including importers’ use of supplier 
verification systems.162 
Finally, FSMA highlights flexibility and voluntary initiatives, two 
New Governance features.  The FSVP allows importers to verify that 
exporters comply with U.S. rules in various ways, thus providing 
importers with great flexibility;163 and further, the Voluntary Qualified 
Importer Protection program grants expedited entry for certified foods 
at a completely voluntary level. 
Next, I turn to the FSMA’s import-safety provisions, which focus on 
cooperative relationships with other governments.  Section 305, 
“Building Capacity of Foreign Governments with Respect to Food 
Safety,” directs the FDA to consider bilateral and multilateral 
agreements, including provisions, under specific situations, to specify 
the responsibility of countries for the safety of food they export.164  
System Recognition is one such program. 
Technically a Memorandum of Understanding, or MOU, between 
two countries, System Recognition is sanctioned by the WTO165 and 
goes beyond bilateral agreements in place.166  Through System 
Recognition, the FDA seeks to leverage the work done by foreign 
 
162. Foreign Supplier Verification Programs for Importers of Food for Humans and Animals, 
78 Fed. Reg. 45730, 45741 (proposed July 29, 2013) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-07-29/pdf/2013-17993.pdf (citations removed). 
163. See 21 U.S.C. § 384a. 
164. See FSMA, H.R. 2751, 111th Cong. § 305 (2011). 
165. See Brunet Marks, supra note 30; see also WORLD TRADE ORG., THE WTO 
AGREEMENTS SERIES: SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES (2010), http://www.wto.org/ 
english/res_e/booksp_e/agrmntseries4_sps_e.pdf. 
166. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to examine the extent to which systems 
recognition agreements advance beyond previous bilateral agreements and to compare the 
bilateral agreements with SPS plus features, this is certainly ripe for future study. 
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competent authorities to help ensure the safety of imported foods.  The 
FDA also gives itself the leeway to work “directly with an export 
certification program of another country, develop bilateral commodity-
specific arrangements, or develop protocols, agreements, or other 
arrangements regarding export certification programs.”167  Negotiating 
these coordinated agreements is a strategy to extend national (U.S.) law 
and exert regulatory pressure consistent with the WTO.  Through the 
use of third-party certification, voluntary standards, and cooperative 
agreements, the FSMA agreement codifies elements of New 
Governance, and serves as an example of New Governance “in action.”  
B.  Using New Governance Versus Traditional Governance 
The FSMA rules codify a new era in regulating food imports, which 
can be viewed as a regulatory transition from command-and-control 
regulation to New Governance.168  As noted earlier, the phenomenon of 
New Governance refers to a regulatory paradigm defined by 
privatization, decentralization, public participation, horizontal 
coordination, experimentation, and a solution-oriented focus.169  
Professor Orly Lobel describes such public-private collaborations as 
systems in which individuals are “norm-generating subjects.”170  In this 
way, a New Governance regime can be understood as a departure from 
a command-and-control model at its very essence, as it is more 
“bottom-up” in nature.171  At a basic level, New Governance is a tool 
orchestrated by the government to engage other public, private, and 
nongovernmental entities in co-regulation.  The central elements of 
New Governance can be narrowed down to four in which the state: 
 
167. Information for Foreign Governments: Frequently Asked Questions on Systems 
Recognition, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.fda.gov/Food/International 
InteragencyCoordination/ucm367400.htm (discussing the FDA System Recognition Program). 
168. FSMA rules presumably have their origins in literature on import safety.  See IMPORT 
SAFETY: REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (Cary Coglianese, Adam M. 
Finkel & David Zaring eds., 2009) (paying particular attention to Part IV, Leveraging the Private 
Sector—including, Kenneth A. Bamberger & Andrew T. Guzman, Importers as Regulators: 
Product Safety in a Globalized World; Errol Meidinger, Private Import Safety Regulation and 
Transnational New Governance; and David Zaring & Cary Coglianese, Delegated Governance: 
Consumer Safety in the Global Marketplace—for discussion on how solutions for import safety 
point to delegated forms of governance to enhance consumer protection). 
169. See Lobel, supra note 25; see also Cohen, supra note 26 (discussing the experimentation 
thread of New Governance). 
170. See Orly Lobel, New Governance as Regulatory Governance, OXFORD HANDBOOK 
GOVERNANCE, Nov. 2012, at 1, 5. 
171. See Jason M. Solomon, Law and Governance in the 21st Century Regulatory State, 86 
TEX. L. REV. 819, 821–23 (2008) (book review) (noting that new governance is more focused on 
learning through monitoring than “compliance with fixed rules”). 
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1. incorporates a decentralized range of actors and institutions, both 
public and private, into the regulatory system, as by negotiating 
standards with firms, encouraging and supervising self-regulation, 
or sponsoring voluntary management systems; 
2. relies on this range of actors for regulatory expertise; 
3. modifies its regulatory responsibilities to emphasize orchestration 
of public and private actors and institutions rather than direct 
promulgation and enforcement of rules; and 
4. utilizes “soft law” to complement or substitute for mandatory “hard 
law.”172 
New Governance can also be understood as a scholarly effort to bring 
together two distinct academic literatures: empirical studies of 
regulation and normative thinking about the role of the state.173  In Law 
and Governance in the 21st Century Regulatory State, John Solomon 
succinctly explains the essential shortcoming of the command-and-
control regulatory model in today’s world.  “In a world of uncertainty,” 
Solomon states, “legislatures and agencies are unable to predict what 
the best rules will be down the road, and the mechanisms for monitoring 
and adjusting the rules in light of experience are severely lacking.”174  
This has led to the need to consider and adopt alternative approaches to 
regulation.  Solomon describes New Governance as “centrally 
coordinated local problem solving” guided by “provisionality and 
revisability in light of experience.”175  The solution-based focus of New 
Governance is in opposition to the deeply engrained tendency of the 
judiciary to find the meaning of texts rather than the solutions to 
problems (a tendency New Governance scholar Michael Dorf attributes 
to the “cut[ting] of the link” between abstract normative propositions 
and natural, observable law).176  Finally, Solomon makes another 
important point in that New Governance efforts in the United States 
versus those in the European Union differ; efforts in the United States 
have been cultivated from the bottom up (often “originating either 
 
172. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 10, at 509 (emphasis omitted); see also Lobel, supra note 
25, at 371–404 (noting eight organizing principles). 
173. Lobel, supra note 25. 
174. Solomon, supra note 171, at 822; see also J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive 
Management—Is it Possible?, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 21, 25 (2005) (noting that we have no 
idea what response the regulation model system would exhibit to any particular command). 
175. Solomon, supra note 171, at 823 (quoting Susan Sturm, Gender Equity Regimes and the 
Architecture of Learning, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 323, 323 
(Grainne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006); and Grianne de Búrca & Joanne Scott, 
Introduction: New Governance, Law and Constitutionalism, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE, 
supra, at 1, 3). 
176. Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court, 1997 Term—Foreword: The Limits of Socratic 
Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 35–39 (1998). 
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within administrative agencies or from particular institutional actors”) 
while many of those in Europe have been developed through funding 
coming from the European Union.177  This distinction is critical because 
much of the scholarship on New Governance examines and analyzes 
systems that have been implemented in Europe.178 
In practice, New Governance has not always been a wholesale shift in 
regulatory methodology.  In some instances, New Governance 
principles coexist with principles normally seen in a command-and-
control regulatory model.179  In the European Union, for example, the 
Water Framework Directive is a hybrid form of government featuring 
characteristics of both New Governance and traditional governance in 
order to maximize its efficacy.180  The main New Governance attributes 
of this directive are horizontal coordination (in the form of information 
sharing) and public participation, with binding legal regulation from 
member states as a traditional regulatory feature.181  In the United 
States, New Governance principles have been used to help minimize 
costly tort litigation in medical malpractice.  In order to “deter negligent 
conduct,” this system 
uses such new governance techniques as “regulation by information” 
through the publication of data on physicians’ results, fiscal incentives 
for good performance by hospitals and clinics, alternative forms of 
victim compensation through administrative processes similar to 
workers compensation, and conflict avoidance through informal 
methods to explain and apologize for error.182 
Another project in the United States is Green Tier, a Wisconsin 
program that promotes innovative strategies developed by regulated 
entities that allows companies to “opt out of a variety of environmental 
regulations if they agree to construct a self-regulatory regime and use it 
to achieve higher standards of environmental performance that is 
required under existing regulations.”183  As Louise and David Trubek 
explain, having the standard regulatory framework in place motivates 
these entities to self-regulate, while the opportunity to opt out allows 
them to create innovative approaches to ultimately enhance regulatory 
 
177. Solomon, supra note 171, at 823–24. 
178. See generally id.; Marian Garcia Martinez et al., Co-regulation as a Possible Model for 
Food Safety Governance: Opportunities for Public-Private Partnerships, 32 FOOD POL’Y 299 
(2007); David M. Trubeck & Louise G. Trubek, New Governance & Legal Regulation: 
Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1, 9–19 (2006). 
179. See Trubek & Trubeck, supra note 178, at 5–21. 
180. Id. at 15–18. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 10. 
183. Id. at 20. 
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efficacy.184 
Given these examples of co-production, nations can use New 
Governance to achieve food safety benefits typically provided by 
private governance.  In some ways, the FSMA is a wholesale shift in 
regulatory methodology.  Embracing private third-party certification to 
certify imports before they reach our ports is new and it certainly 
engages private actors to co-regulate.  In other ways, however, it uses 
command and control; system integration agreements intentionally rely 
upon other public actors for expertise while they are negotiated as 
traditional bilateral agreements with other public actors. 
So far, examples have highlighted primarily domestic New 
Governance models.  It is useful to note the existence of another New 
Governance framework that recognizes the potential of New 
Governance for the international system.  Abbott and Snidal develop a 
framework for adapting the domestic New Governance model of 
regulation to the international setting.185  The authors argue that the 
rapid multiplication of regulatory standard-setting initiatives, mostly 
between public and private parties, is creating a new kind of 
transnational regulatory system, one that demands a broader view of 
regulation and a more nuanced view of the state as a regulator.186  States 
and intergovernmental organizations are at the center of their 
framework, trying to orchestrate or provide a wide range of directive 
and facilitative measures designed to support and steer private and 
public actors to the regulatory system.187  The way in which the FSMA 
applies New Governance features—principally through embracing 
third-party certification and bilateral agreements on food safety—may 
be considered an example of “Transnational” New Governance.  Abbott 
and Snidal note that with New Governance, states can more easily 
organize actors because New Governance focuses on state orchestration, 
dispersed expertise, soft law, and decentralization, whereas 
 
184. Id. 
185. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 10.  In their framework, Abbott and Snidal present a 
“governance triangle” with many standard-setting schemes inside the triangle; inside, schemes 
can be aligned to one of three corners: States, NGOs, and Firms.  In this Article, I focus on State 
practices (the United States), Firm practices (Schemes), and NGO practices (CODEX and WTO).  
I omit the study of organizations that are hybrid NGO-Firms, which in the food area include: the 
International Federation of Organic Agriculture, Fairtrade Labeling Organization, and Common 
Code for the Coffee Community, social, environmental standard, to name a few.  Mapping out a 
Governance Triangle with respect to food safety would be a worthwhile exercise to fully 
understand the potential conversations between and contributions of the various food safety 
actors. 
186. See id. at 506. 
187. Id. at 510. 
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Transnational New Governance focuses on limited state orchestration, 
and even more dispersed expertise, voluntary codes, and 
decentralization.188  The authors suggest how states can organize actors 
and intergovernmental organizations in the Transnational New 
Governance framework to support and steer the regulatory standard-
setting schemes.189 
While the Transnational New Governance system establishes a 
framework that is applicable to food safety, there are some key 
distinctions.  FSMA is doing exactly what Abbott and Snidal suggest, 
“extend[ing] a major domestic New Governance approach to the 
international plane by relaxing legal and administrative requirements for 
firms that adhere to approved transnational regulatory standard-setting 
schemes and require adherence by their suppliers.”190  But, under 
Transnational New Governance, the state has limited involvement; 
whereas under FSMA, the state continues to play a significant role in 
orchestrating the alignment of public-private contacts.  For instance, 
under FSMA, private actors (exporters) are encouraged to seek 
certification for their exported products by incentives such as the 
Voluntary Qualified Importer Program—which provides expedited 
entry for certified foods for approved exporters.191  To summarize, 
although the FSMA rules contain elements of Transnational New 
Governance, the rules most closely resemble an attempt to incorporate 
New Governance features into a traditionally command-and-control 
governance framework.  The following Section introduces the “lessons 
learned” from using New Governance.  
C.  New Governance: Lessons Learned 
Given that New Governance has been tried and tested with varying 
levels of success in other fields,192 it becomes useful to examine these 
experiences to identify opportunities and pitfalls for regulators 
implementing New Governance features.  Because third-party 
certification is a prototypical example of New Governance, the focus 
here is on implementing a third-party certification program. 
 
188. Id. 
189. Id. at 511. 
190. Id. at 565. 
191. FSMA, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 21 U.S.C.) 
192. See Gordon Hayburn, Challenges for Auditing and Food Safety Management Systems: A 
Point of View, 134 PERSP. PUB. HEALTH 196, 197 (2014) (noting that the United Kingdom, 
Canada and the United States recognize the value of the third-party audit through ideas like 
earned recognition in the United Kingdom, Canada’s Safe Food For Canadians Act, and the 
FSMA). 
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1.  Opportunities 
Using third-party certification can bring specific benefits.  It is first 
useful to note that third-party certification is not new to U.S. regulators.  
Successful third-party certification programs have been mandated by 
legislation, and still others have been run by the FDA.  For instance, in 
1992, the Mammography Quality Standards Act required the FDA to 
approve accreditation bodies to evaluate and accredit mammography 
facilities based upon quality standards.193  As referenced in the 
proposed FSMA rules, under the Mammography Quality Standards Act, 
only facilities that were accredited by an FDA-approved accreditation 
body received approval to legally perform mammography.194  In 2008, 
Congress enacted the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act 
requiring children’s products to be tested by an approved third-party 
laboratory to certify compliance with product safety rules.195  The 
Consumer Product Safety Commission approves accreditation bodies to 
accredit qualified third-party laboratories to test and certify products.  
Over 400 approved laboratories around the world test and certify 
imported and domestically manufactured products.196  In 2010, 
Congress enacted the Formaldehyde Standards for Composite-Wood 
Products Act to address concerns about the public’s exposure to 
formaldehyde emissions from manufactured products and building 
materials.197  The EPA’s third-party certification framework, modeled 
on California’s program for verifying compliance with emissions limits, 
involves the EPA approving accreditation bodies to accredit qualified 
third-party certifiers.198 
In terms of specific benefits, the literature suggests that introducing 
private third parties to conduct regulatory duties such as third-party 
certification can provide five key benefits: (1) gatekeeping and 
monitoring expertise, (2) enhanced credibility and information sharing, 
(3) cost savings, (4) food safety gains, and (5) gaining industry 
 
193. Mammography Quality Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 102-539, 106 Stat. 3547 (1994). 
194. See Accreditation of Third-Party Auditors/Certification Bodies to Conduct Food Safety 
Audits and to Issue Certifications, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,782, 45786 (proposed July 29, 2013) (to be 
codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 1, 16) (referring to Mammography Quality Standards Act provisions). 
195. Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 110-314, 122 Stat. 3016 (2008). 
196. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 3. 
197. Formaldehyde Standards for Composite Wood Products Act, Pub. L. No. 111-199, 124 
Stat. 1359 (2010); see also Katie Greenhaw, Growing Use of Third Parties to Certify Health and 
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cooperation and reducing the regulatory burden.199  The examples 
below are drawn from country examples (the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, and Canada) as well as industry examples in technology law, 
consumer protection law, and agricultural law. 
Gatekeeping and Monitoring Expertise.  Third-party certification can 
provide a function that governments may be failing in—the ability to 
use third-party certifiers as “gatekeepers” rather than mere deterrence.  
For example, there are instances where foreign firms say they have a 
Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point plan, or HACCP,200 in place but 
either the foreign firm is actually not following it, or FDA regulators 
have failed in overseeing it through onsite audits.201  Third-party 
certification will ensure that companies claiming to have a safety plan 
or a HACCP plan actually have one in place.  Third-party certification 
also provides the ability to utilize the monitoring expertise that 
industries have developed through the common practice of having 
voluntary certification schemes in place. 
Enhanced Credibility and Information Sharing.  From a business-
oriented perspective, third-party certifications provide credibility, 
information, and quality assurance to customers.  Using the 2008 
Chinese Infant Formula Scandal as an example, evidence suggests that 
consumers of foods grown and manufactured in China would have 
greater confidence in those products if China were to allow a wider 
range of certifiers and labs to operate in China,202 and if government-
sponsored tests and certifications could be verified by private-sector 
third parties.203  Third-party certifications can also provide companies 
 
199. See generally Hatanaka et al., supra note 99; Lytton & McAllister, supra note 27; Lesley 
K. McAllister, Regulation by Third-Party Verification, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2012). 
200. FSMA “Preventative Measures” require food producers to develop and maintain a food 
safety management system based on the principles of HACCP, a Codex standard. 
201. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-286, SEAFOOD SAFETY: FDA 
NEEDS TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF IMPORTED SEAFOOD AND BETTER LEVERAGE LIMITED 
RESOURCES 14–16 (2011), http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/317734.pdf. 
202. FRED GALE & JEAN C. BUZBY, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., ECON. INFO. BULLETIN NO. 52, 
IMPORTS FROM CHINA AND FOOD SAFETY ISSUES 23–24 (2009), http://www.ers.usda. 
gov/media/156008/eib52_1_.pdf (noting that the HACCP certification for Chinese exporters is 
performed by provincial quarantine bureaus). 
CQC, China’s largest certification agency, also performs HACCP certifications, as 
well as organic, GAP, ISO 9000, and other certifications.  CQC is nominally an 
independent entity but was a branch of [the General Administration of Quality 
Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (China’s administrative agency in charge of 
overseeing food safety operations)] until 2002.  [Studies have found] that water quality 
testing in China was beset by technical problems, funding and manpower shortages, 
and selective testing or manipulation of data by officials. 
Id. at 24. 
203. Id.; see also Alexandra Stevenson & Paul Mozur, China’s Long Food Chain Plugs In, 
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with a competitive edge on rival companies, as certification through a 
third-party organization creates a premium on products.204  Finally, 
giant food retailers, who have collectively chosen to obtain products 
from the same centralized procurement centers, use third-party 
certifications as a way to mitigate the risk of reputation damage from a 
foodborne illness outbreak that cannot definitively be traced to a single 
isolated store.205 
Third-party certification provides the ability to keep up with the 
growing data needs involved in market-based regulation.  As noted 
earlier, an added benefit to food safety schemes (which require third-
party certification) is that, in addition to establishing higher food safety 
standards, schemes are reviewed and revised more regularly than the 
Codex General Principles of Food Hygiene Code of Practice; therefore, 
they attempt to address issues that are currently faced by the food 
industry such as incident management, food defense, and allergen 
management. 206 
Cost Savings.  There is evidence that governments save money when 
they use third-party certifications,207 but only when governments do not 
become accreditation bodies themselves.  Third-party certification 
provides the ability to shift regulatory costs to the regulated entity—
suppliers incur the cost of certification—which has proven to be a great 
advantage for regulators.  In 2014, in the midst of budget cuts, the 
Netherlands launched a program to coordinate food safety as a shared 
responsibility (co-regulation) between public and private actors.208  The 
Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority deployed a 
strategy to assess and monitor the function of private third-party 
certifiers to use in its own enforcement activities.  The Authority 
approved eleven “self-control” systems in food production, catering, 
and retail industries and used the systems and their audit results to 
determine inspection frequency, inspection length, and firm-specific 
interventions.  The process was termed “meta-regulation,” a concept 
 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/02/business/international/chinas-
long-food-chain-plugs-in.html (noting that despite efforts to place certificates on food items and 
certifying the quality of the supply chain, consumers do not trust certificates of quality claiming 
that they can be “faked”). 
204. B. James Deaton, A Theoretical Framework for Examining the Role of Third-Party 
Certifiers, 15 FOOD CONTROL 615 (2004). 
205. Hatanaka et al., supra note 99, at 358–59. 
206. See Recognised Schemes, supra note 118 (discussing GFSI-recognized schemes). 
207. See Watrous, supra note 127 (discussing Wal-Mart’s cost savings, as well as food safety 
gains, when it introduced a GFSI-benchmarked certification system). 
208. See Verbruggen & Havinga, supra note 11, at 6 (introducing the drivers for meta-control 
in the Netherlands). 
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that concerns the activity of “regulating the regulators, whether they be 
public agencies, private corporate self-regulators or third-party 
gatekeepers.”209  The findings show that in times of budgetary 
constraints, collaborating with private assurance schemes can be a cost-
effective alternative to reduce inspection costs while maintaining 
inspection coverage. 
Food Safety Gains.  To my knowledge, FDA regulators were not 
cognizant that considering third-party certification and moving away 
from traditional regulation was a step toward embracing New 
Governance.  There is evidence, however, that they were aware that 
considering third-party certification and moving away from traditional 
regulation was a step toward enhanced food safety.  In 2004, based on a 
conclusion that seafood imports were unsafe to eat, the General 
Accounting Office issued a seafood safety report recommending that the 
FDA explore the possibility of certifying third parties to conduct 
inspections of foreign seafood processors and domestic importers, 
similar to the FDA’s third-party inspection program for medical 
devices.210  Then, in 2008, a program referred to as the Shrimp Pilot 
was launched to examine the potential FDA use of third-party 
certification.211  The Shrimp Pilot succeeded in teaching the FDA that 
third-party certification could lead to gains in screening imports and that 
direct accreditation, in which the FDA accredits and provides direct 
oversight to third-party certification bodies, would be “costly and 
administratively burdensome.”212  Ultimately, the FDA decided to 
include the use of third-party audits as a part of import controls in 
FSMA.213 
Third-party certification schemes have been shown to enhance food 
safety.  Increased compliance with food safety laws was one outcome 
noted by the Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority.  
 
209. See id. 
210. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-246, FOOD SAFETY: FDA’S IMPORTED 
SEAFOOD SAFETY PROGRAM SHOWS SOME PROGRESS, BUT FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS ARE 
NEEDED (2004). 
211. Voluntary Third-Party Certification Programs for Imported Aquacultured Shrimp; Notice 
of Pilot Program, 73 Fed. Reg. 39705 (July 10, 2008); see also Assessment of the Third-Party 
Certification Pilot for Aquacultured Shrimp, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ 
food/guidanceregulation/guidancedocumentsregulatoryinformation/seafood/ucm265934.htm (last 
updated Aug. 27, 2015). 
212. Accreditation of Third-Party Auditors/Certification Bodies to Conduct Food Safety 
Audits and to Issue Certifications, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,782, 45,786 (proposed July 29, 2013) (to be 
codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 1, 16). 
213. David Acheson, Third-Party Audits—Their Crucial Role in Moving Forward with FSMA 
and Food Safety, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/ 
11/third-party-audits-their-crucial-role-in-moving-forward-with-fsma-and-food-safety/. 
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The private auditors chosen in the enforcement program, discussed 
above, tended to visit firms more often, and may have combined 
inspection and advice, thereby increasing compliance.214  In Canada and 
the United Kingdom, the use of private, retailer-driven farm assurance 
schemes has been shown to enhance food safety.215  In a report 
submitted by McAllister and commissioned by the Administrative 
Conference of the United States, the author hailed third-party 
certification programs, stating that “third-party programs may be 
particularly effective when regulated products or processes are 
international in scope”—while also recognizing that these programs 
have the potential to undermine regulatory goals and impose high 
costs.216  Using three companies as examples, the GFSI notes that 
suppliers with good food safety practices help increase reliability of 
supply, reduce costs for quality and procurement departments, reduce 
staff time on recalls and withdrawals, and increase customer loyalty—
all of which lead to increased sales.217 
Gaining Industry Cooperation and Reducing the Regulatory Burden.  
The history of Internet regulation provides guiding principles for 
adopting a different regulatory structure to gain, or re-gain, industry 
cooperation, which can be translated for the purpose of revising food 
safety regulation.  While current discussion on the future of the Internet 
focuses on whether or not regulating the Internet is prudent (e.g., 
network neutrality debates), one may recall that the Internet began as a 
government-backed operation and was privatized in the 1990s.218  
Policymakers realized that a new regulatory model was needed outside 
the traditional command-and-control model as corporative norms began 
to break down.219  As options for the future of the Internet were 
emerging, telecommunications and technology law scholar Phil Weiser 
 
214. Verbruggen & Havinga, supra note 11, at 21. 
215. Martinez et al., supra note 178, at 304–06. 
216. See ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE 
RECOMMENDATION 2012-7: AGENCY USE OF THIRD-PARTY PROGRAMS TO ASSESS 
REGULATORY COMPLIANCE (2012) (noting that in 2012, the Administrative Conference of the 
United States, an independent body that provides recommendations for federal agency 
procedures, recommended, based on a comprehensive report prepared by consultant Lesley 
McAllister, addressing some issues arising from agencies developing third-party programs); 
LESLEY K. MCALLISTER, THIRD-PARTY PROGRAMS TO ASSESS REGULATORY COMPLIANCE 
(2012), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Draft-Report-on-Third-Party-
Programs-to-Assess-Regulatory-Compliance.pdf. 
217. See GFSI, GFSI GENERAL PRESENTATION (2015), http://www.mygfsi.com/files/ 
Information_Kit/GFSI_GeneralPresentation_201511.pdf (citing food safety gains and cost 
reductions as a result of GFSI benchmarking). 
218. Philip J. Weiser, The Future of Internet Regulation, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 529 (2009). 
219. Id. 
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recommended that the FCC act as a co-regulator (granting decision-
making power to a self-regulatory organization who operates under 
FCC oversight), while also acting as a norm entrepreneur (identifying 
areas of collaboration) and as an ex-post adjudicator of breakdowns in 
cooperation. 
Third-party certification can reduce an industry’s regulatory burden.  
In 2006, the FDA and Health Canada initiated the pilot “Multipurpose 
Audit Program.”220  The pilot explored the potential benefits to medical 
device manufacturers and agencies of using a single third party to 
conduct both FDA and Health Canada inspections and audits at the 
same time in one joint audit-inspection.  The hope was that, using one 
third-party to simultaneously meet FDA and Health Canada regulatory 
requirements for systems quality, could potentially reduce the industry’s 
regulatory burden.221  The results from the ten joint audit-inspections 
under the pilot showed that the joint approach reduced the time spent in 
manufacturing facilities by about one-third, on average, compared to the 
estimated time required for separate FDA and Health Canada audits and 
inspections—thereby reducing the regulatory burden for the industry.222  
In addition, the FDA and Health Canada gained a better understanding 
of their respective audit and inspection approaches, providing a 
foundation for leveraging inspection resources in the future.223 
2.  Perils 
There are several downsides to experimenting with New Governance.  
Examples are drawn from country examples (the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom, and Canada), as well as industry examples in the 
fields of finance, privacy law, and environmental law.  This Subsection 
highlights the five most prominent perils associated with third-party 
certification: (1) conflict of interest and lack of independence, (2) 
overreliance on the “checklist” mentality, (3) auditor incompetence, (4) 
no requirement to disclose, and (5) mismanaging third-party certifiers. 
Conflict of Interest and Lack of Independence.  When private auditors 
are paid for by their auditees, a conflict arises between the financial 
interest of the auditor and protecting the public from food safety risks. 
This lack of independence prevents an objective audit—a problem that 
has been identified with third-party certification systems.224  In 
economic terms, auditors have a financial interest in getting hired and 
 




224. Hatanaka & Busch, supra note 107. 
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rehired by suppliers, and as profit maximizers, suppliers naturally shop 
around for the cheapest certification they can obtain.  The tension with 
this is that auditors also have a professional obligation to report food 
safety risks.  Lytton and McAllister discuss incentives for private 
certifiers to acquire accounts from suppliers, who want the cheapest 
certification, thus leading to certifiers lowering their standards of 
inspection.225  The incentive is for a company to hire a certification 
body that provides the company with the best chance to become 
certified.226 
In the financial sector, the problem of auditor independence stems 
from the auditor having two masters: the client and the shareholder.227 
Third-party certifiers “are thus placed in an inherently difficult position, 
since they are in effect public fiduciaries employed by the very private 
actors whose activities they are supposed to assess and monitor.”228  In 
some situations, financial auditors and third-party certifiers are so eager 
to serve their clients that they may help their client find ways to 
formally comply with rules while achieving outcomes that the rules 
were intended to prevent.  The problem of auditor independence in 
financial audits is exacerbated when auditing firms provide their clients 
with additional “non-audit” consulting and tax services.229  Demski’s 
Enron example summarizes the difficulties in using third-party certifiers 
 
225. Lytton & McAllister, supra note 27. 
226. Albersmeier et al., supra note 151. 
227. See Amy Shapiro, Who Pays the Auditor Calls the Tune?: Auditing Regulation and 
Clients’ Incentives, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1029, 1031 (2005) (arguing that the auditor problem 
is a problem of two masters and that the law needs to be written “so that auditors recognize 
proper incentives and serve only one master, a master whose own interests are aligned with those 
of the investing public”).  See generally Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based 
Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
691, 718 (2003) (concluding that management-based regulation needs to be designed in a way 
that ensures firms are monitored and requirements enforced, and more frequent inspections by 
government, independent third-party auditors, or committees that include union or community 
representatives will likely be critical to the success of management-based strategies). 
228. Errol E. Meidinger, The New Environmental Law: Forest Certification, 10 BUFF. ENVTL. 
L.J. 211, 284 (2002). 
229. Keith A. Houghton & Christine A. Jubb, The Market for Financial Report Audits: 
Regulation of and Competition for Auditor Independence, 25 LAW & POL’Y 299, 308–09 (2003); 
see, e.g., Patricia A. McCoy, Realigning Auditors’ Incentives, 35 CONN. L. REV. 989, 990 (2003) 
(stating that the basic problem afflicting the accounting industry is that “accounting firms work 
for the companies they audit”); Geoffrey P. Miller, Catastrophic Financial Failures: Enron and 
More, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 423, 423–25 (2004) (discussing questionable accounting and 
questionable accountants in recent catastrophic financial collapses); see also Jonathan Macey & 
Hillary A. Sale, Observations on the Role of Commodification, Independence, and Governance in 
the Accounting Industry, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1167, 1167 (2003) (finding that, over time, accounting 
firms began to market professional services beyond the audit and those services became more 
profitable than the audits). 
15_MARKS FINAL .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/1/2016  12:58 PM 
952 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  47 
in finance.  He notes that independence is psychologically impossible 
because (1) accounting firms provide non-auditing services. such as 
consultation and tax; (2) personnel often move from accounting firms to 
their clients’ firms; and (3) there is a close affinity with the client.230 
In environmental law, one common complaint is that companies have 
the opportunity to shop around for a favorable verifier and put pressure 
on verifiers for a favorable outcome.231  Using forestry as an example, 
Sasha Stashwick argues for true third-party certification—i.e., the 
Forest Stewardship Council or Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels—
which reliably provides standards and assessments, as well as public 
agreements between environmental advocates and corporations, over 
“self-certification”—i.e., the Sustainable Forestry Initiative—which 
lacks financial independence from the industry they claim to oversee 
and thereby allows for destructive forestry practices.232 
Sustainable forestry initiatives have been criticized for having 
unbalanced representation and no real decision-making authority.  The 
Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification Schemes, 
established by the forest and wood products industry (and which 
includes the Sustainable Forestry Initiative as a benchmarked scheme), 
fails to adequately comply with three minimum environmental 
requirements—the prohibition on natural forest conversion, the 
protection of key habitats and species, and the respect for indigenous 
peoples and local community rights—because it lacks a balanced 
representation and real decision-making authority due to its failure to 
include nongovernmental organizations and other stakeholders in its 
general assembly.233  In addition, the Programme does not require 
freely available information about the forest management practices and 
decisions.  Finally, other noted problems with audits include: (1) small 
audit teams and too little time devoted to assessing performance, (2) 
poor standards enforcement, and (3) lack of oversight of the certifying 
 
230. Joel S. Demski, Corporate Conflicts of Interest, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 51, 56–57 (2003). 
231. See Neil Gunningham, Environmental Auditing: Who Audits the Auditors?, ENVTL. & 
PLAN. L.J., Aug. 1993, at 229, 234 (assuming the existence of a market in verifier services, 
companies have the opportunity to shop around for a favorable verifier and put pressure on 
verifiers for a favorable outcome); see also McAllister, supra note 199. 
232. Sasha Stashwick, Foxes Guarding the Henhouse; Why “Self-Certification” in the 
Biomass Industry Threatens our Forests, SWITCHBOARD NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL STAFF 
BLOG (June 4, 2013), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/slyutse/the_fox_is_guarding_the_hen_ 
ho.html.  See generally Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public 
Regulation: The Case of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 47 (2006) (finding that while the 
certification programs are becoming increasingly transparent and participatory, some of them still 
need considerable improvement and all of them face serious challenges). 
233. GREENPEACE ET AL., ON THE GROUND 2011: THE CONTROVERSIES OF PEFC AND SFI 
(2011). 
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bodies by the system itself.234 
Overreliance on the “Checklist” Mentality.  A great deal of trust goes 
into the process of certification—trust that may perhaps be unwarranted 
when certifiers over-rely upon “checklists” and thereby capture a 
“snapshot in time.”  As a certification body auditor admits, “[w]e are 
only on a production site for 3 days out of 365.  It is just a snapshot in 
time.  The ultimate responsibility to mitigate unforeseen hazards or 
defects is on the producers and processors who are there 365 days, and 
not on us.  We are just a checker.”235  In the 2009 Salmonella in peanuts 
outbreak, implicating contaminated peanuts manufactured by the Peanut 
Corporation of America (“PCA”), legal records showed that Salmonella 
had been present in PCA peanuts as early as 2007.  To be sure, it is not 
possible for an auditor to check every aspect of a company’s methods, 
and most auditors rely on checklists, as well as reviewing the 
documentation that a company has on itself, to complete the audits.  In 
the same way, some accreditation bodies accredit certification bodies 
based on documentation they have submitted. 
Auditor Incompetence.  Returning to the 2011 Colorado Listeria 
Outbreak, a deadly outbreak that was ultimately sourced to Colorado-
based cantaloupe farmers: The farmers had received a nearly perfect 
rating during their audit, however, the Primus Labs auditor who was 
responsible for auditing the Colorado outfit was young and new to the 
job.236  This highlights the point that Doug Powell and others raise in 
the literature, that there have been many foodborne illness outbreaks 
linked to food processors that have passed third-party audits and 
inspections, raising questions about the utility of both.237  The authors 
identify limitations of food safety audits and inspections and provide 
recommendations for strengthening the system, based on developing a 
strong food safety culture throughout the food safety system.238  
Auditor incompetence has been cited repeatedly in the PCA Salmonella 
outbreak, noted above.239  In the PCA case, the auditor was an expert in 
 
234. Id. 
235. Hatanaka & Busch, supra note 107, at 86. 
236. See Lytton & McAllister, supra note 27; see also Michael Booth & Jennifer Brown, 
Colorado Cantaloupe Farmers Charged by Federal Officials in Fatal Listeria Outbreak, DENV. 
POST (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_24182307/colorado-
cantaloupe-farm-charged-by-federal-officials-fatal. 
237. Douglas Powell et al., Audits and Inspections Are Never Enough: A Critique to Enhance 
Food Safety, 30 FOOD CONTROL 686 (2013). 
238. See id. (recommending that including risk-based verification steps to the auditing system 
would increase the food safety culture). 
239. See id. at 689 (noting that even employees said the facility was “a dump,” but did not 
report their concerns to officials before people became ill and died); see also Michael Moss & 
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fresh produce and not peanuts.  With respect to auditor scope, there are 
instances where the audit did not include all of the ingredients.  In the 
2007 outbreak related to Salmonella in Pirate’s Booty brand popcorn, 
the audit did not extend to the culprit, imported spice ingredients.240  
Regulators should consider these examples related to auditor expertise 
and scope as they design improved auditor programs. 
No Requirement to Disclose.  The Netherlands Food and Consumer 
Product Safety Authority noted a problem with using private certifiers: 
systems, auditors, and inspectors are not required to advise and alert the 
agency of situations involving major noncompliance and serious risk to 
public health and safety.  The Authority found that, without mandating 
the transmission of noncompliance to the agency, it is possible that 
firms may slip through the system.241  In other words, when firms are 
not required to report breaches in food safety, those breaches, and their 
corresponding threats to health and safety, will persist.  
Mismanaging Third-Party Certifiers.  The growth of Internet-related 
business and the amount of personal data that is exchanged over the 
Internet has heightened consumer fears over Internet security and 
privacy.  Companies have emerged to increase consumer trust by 
offering third-party certification programs such as the Trusted 
Download Program or the web seal program from TRUSTe, a major 
provider of privacy certifications for online businesses.242  TRUSTe’s 
 
Andrew Martin, Food Problems Elude Private Inspectors, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/06/business/06food.html?pagewanted=2&_r= (criticizing third-
party audits using the PCA example).  See generally Roy Costa, Process and Substance in Third-
Party Food Safety Audits, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Jul. 24, 2014), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/ 
2014/07/process-and-substance-in-third-party-food-safety-audits/ (arguing that weaknesses in 
third-party audits—no requirement to run scientific tests, advance notice of audits, buyers can 
stop audits, no requirement to report failures to the FDA or the public—will continue to cause 
food-borne illness outbreaks, citing the PCA salmonella outbreak and the Listeria outbreak from 
cantaloupes). 
240. See Dan Flynn, Veggie Booty Salmonella Outbreak, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Sept. 22, 
2009), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2009/09/meaningful-outbreak-9-veggie-booty-salmonella 
-outbreak/ (reporting that the FDA inspection determined that the supplier of Veggie Booty’s 
spices failed to inspect and handle raw materials to ascertain that they were clean and suitable for 
processing into food). 
241. See Powell et al., supra note 237, at 689 (noting that third-party auditing can assist 
regulatory agencies, but only if the data is shared with agencies). 
242. See Tom Spring, The Trouble With Truste, PCWORLD, http://www.pcworld.com/ 
article/129338/article.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2016); see also Pingjun Jiang et al., How Third-
Party Certification Programs Relate to Consumer Trust in Online Transactions: An Exploratory 
Study, 25 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 839 (2008) (stating key strategy to increase consumer trust in 
ordering has been participation in third-party certification programs); Trevor T. Moores & 
Gurpreet Dhillon, Do Privacy Seals in E-Commerce Really Work?, COMM. ACM, Dec. 2013, at 
265 (finding three main privacy seals—TRUSTe, WebTrust, and BBBOnline—have adopted a 
set of data privacy principles to ensure compliance by recipient websites). 
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efforts to certify software programs as safe and in compliance with the 
group’s privacy standards have been hailed as “innovative effort[s] to 
address a serious online consumer concern”;243 however, independent 
audits have reported that sites claiming to be TRUSTe-compliant often 
are not and that some companies offering TRUSTe-approved programs 
have been criticized in the past for distributing adware, spyware, and 
attempting to make changes to system settings on personal computers.  
As recent as 2014, TRUSTe settled a lawsuit for deceiving consumers 
about its recertification program for the company’s privacy practices, as 
well as perpetuating its misrepresentation as a non-profit entity.244  
Important for this Article’s purposes, TRUSTe failed to conduct annual 
recertification of companies holding TRUSTe privacy seals.245 
The paragraphs within this Subsection reviewed the criticisms 
implicating third-party certification, drawing attention to examples in 
several industries.  While there are certainly concerns that were not 
noted—for instance, that over-certification is encouraging confusion 
and stifling innovation throughout the entire system—these and other 
topics are ripe for future study but not discussed herein.246 
III.  RESISTING COMPLACENCY: A ROADMAP FOR IMPROVING THE U.S. 
RULES 
Passing the FSMA, with its focus on prevention and New 
Governance features, was groundbreaking—but the work is not done.  
In a few years when the FSMA is finally implemented, the United 
States will, for the first time in history, begin using private third-party 
certifications to monitor imports.  I have argued that the transition to use 
private parties to fulfill traditional government function of screening 
imports is a move toward New Governance and has the potential to 
raise food safety standards beyond minimum standards available with 
Codex.  I have argued that we have limited options given financial 
constraints and international agreements, and that New Governance is 
the only way for the United States to raise food standards.  And yet, the 
New Governance framework is not perfect.  Regulators need to be 
 
243. Spring, supra note 242 (quoting Lydia Parnes, director of the Consumer Protection 
Division with the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)). 
244. Press Release, FTC, TRUSTe Settles FTC Charges It Deceived Consumers Through Its 
Privacy Seal Program: Company Failed to Conduct Annual Recertifications, Facilitated 
Misrepresentation as Non-Profit (Nov. 17, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2014/11/truste-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived-consumers-through-its. 
245. Id. 
246. See Marc Stoiber, Is Eco-certification a Carrot—or Killer—for Innovation?, FAST CO. 
(Apr. 9, 2010, 7:04 PM), http://www.fastcompany.com/1612295/is-eco-certification-a-carrot-or-
killer-for-innovation (noting that overabundance of labels encourages confusion). 
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mindful of case studies where New Governance has not been successful, 
in financial regulation,247 for instance, and in other fields.248  This final 
Part describes how moving to a New Governance system will address 
the identified pitfalls.  It also suggests lingering concerns. 
A.  Regime Enforcement 
For third-party certification to be successful, regulators need to be 
mindful of the pitfalls associated with implementing third-party 
certification, and of practical recommendations.  Thus, this Section 
takes the perils noted in Part II—(1) conflict of interest and lack of 
independence, (2) overreliance on the checklist mentality, (3) auditor 
incompetence, (4) no requirement to disclose, and (5) mismanaging 
third-party certifiers—and evaluates how the FSMA addresses these 
issues by providing recommendations toward designing a successful 
third-party certification program. 
Can we confidently assert that the New Governance paradigm will 
lead to higher food safety, as suggested?  Potential solutions to each 
pitfall are discussed followed by how the FSMA specifically addresses 
the concern and where the FSMA falls short.  In the case of the 2011 
Colorado Listeria outbreak, for example, food safety regulators learned 
that auditor competence was an issue and a careful reading of the 
FSMA suggests that the rules address concerns with auditor competency 
in this case.   
In some cases, more legislative authority or guidance is necessary.  
With respect to conflict of interest, third-party auditors are not 
prevented from working in-house for their clients and auditors are not 
prevented from performing other services for their auditees.  The 
“checklist mentality” could be addressed by requiring a certain number 
of unannounced visits as is being considered by the GFSI.  Auditors 
could achieve competence if they were required to complete certain 
defined coursework and field training instead of fulfilling 
recommendations.  There are other cases where more legislative 
authority is not necessary.  For instance, the FSMA rules are appropriate 
with respect to the requirement to disclose and management of third-
party certifiers. 
Conflict of Interest and Lack of Independence.  The literature on 
 
247. Cristie Ford provides caution for implementing a localized, privatized, horizontally-
situated regulatory regime.  Cristie Ford, New Governance in the Teeth of Human Frailty: 
Lessons from Financial Regulation, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 441. 
248. It took ten years for the U.S. Federal Government to develop organic standards because 
public-private co-regulation and cooperation failed. 
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third-party certification and privatization generally teaches us that 
conflicts of interest arise when the auditor is paid by the entity being 
audited;249 the same literature explains that such conflicts are a 
structural feature of any private scheme.  Conflicts of interest can be 
minimized by leveraging a network of actors who all play a role in 
constraining economic actors.250  Laura Dickinson’s early work on 
privatization stresses the importance of requiring strong accountability 
mechanisms (through contracting) for private actors.251  Lytton and 
McAllister’s comprehensive study on third-party certification and 
conflict of interest recommends oversight mechanisms to address this 
problem, including: supplier self-regulation, audit firm quality control, 
buyer vigilance, tort litigation, liability insurance, accreditation, food 
safety scheme licensing, and benchmarking.252  Some of these 
mechanisms certainly include contracting as Dickinson proposed.  For 
auditors to certify against a scheme, they have to be licensed by a 
scheme owner, which means abiding by the scheme owner’s conflict-of-
interest rules.  Food safety scheme licensing creates an incentive for 
auditors to conduct audits that meet the conflict-of-interest standards of 
scheme owners.253  The FSMA rules emulate those found in the private 
sector—the FDA approves accreditation bodies, which have conflict-of-
interest rules that third-party certifiers will have to adopt. 
Case studies also provide useful guidance.  In the financial 
accounting literature, deficiencies in auditor independence have been 
attributed to the lack of a strong, governmentally sanctioned system of 
rules and standards to regulate the accreditation of auditors and the 
practice of auditing.254  And in the environmental (forestry) context, 
including nongovernmental organizations in the discussion has proven 
pivotal.255 
The FSMA rules have guidelines on accrediting auditors and contain 
standards on audit firm quality control and accreditation as means to 
 
249. See McAllister, supra note 199, at 28–44. 
250. See Abraham L. Newman & David Zaring, Regulatory Networks: Power, Legitimacy, 
and Compliance, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 244 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack 
eds., 2013). 
251. See Laura A. Dickinson, Public Law Values in a Privatized World, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 
383, 402 (2006) (setting forth ways in which government contractual provisions could be used to 
extend and enforce public law values in the foreign affairs privatization context). 
252. See Lytton & McAllister, supra note 27, at 304 (table 1 presents an overview of 
oversight actors, regulatory instruments, and comparative criteria). 
253. Id. at 319. 
254. Shapiro, supra note 227, at 1056–64; see also Hatanaka & Busch, supra note 107. 
255. See supra notes 231–233 and accompanying texts. 
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prevent conflicts of interest.  The proposed FDA rules often cite 
International Standard Organization standard “ISO/IEC 17011:2004” on 
accreditation bodies256—a standard that private schemes use for their 
accreditation purposes.  The FSMA contains conflict-of-interest rules 
for auditors,257 which give the FDA authority to closely monitor these 
systems and revoke an accreditation body’s recognition or withdraw an 
auditor’s accreditation for good cause—for example, if a supplier that it 
certifies is linked to a serious outbreak of foodborne illness; if it refuses 
to grant the FDA access to its records; if it demonstrates “bias or lack of 
objectivity”; or if its “performance call[s] into question the validity or 
reliability of its food safety audits.”258  To counter specific perils that 
were highlighted in the finance industry—such as the trend for 
personnel to often move from accounting firms to their client firms and 
the close affinity the accounting firms hold with the client259—the 
FSMA has been drafted with a “written program to protect against 
conflicts of interest.”260  The contents of the program propose to ensure 
that third-party auditors do not own or have an interest in an eligible 
entity to be certified or an affiliate of such an entity, and that a third-
party auditor cannot accept gifts or payments of value from the eligible 
entity to be audited or certified.261  One drawback is that this program is 
limited, however, as it does not prevent third-party auditors from 
working in-house for their clients. 
The critique to include nongovernmental organizations in the 
regulatory conversation is not a foreseeable problem with respect to the 
FSMA.  The FDA participates in and collaborates with seven leading 
 
256. See INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO/IEC 17011:2004: CONFORMITY 
ASSESSMENT—GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCREDITATION BODIES ACCREDITING 
CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT BODIES (2004), http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail?csnumber 
=29332 (discussing the conformity assessment); see also ISO/IEC Standard for “One-Stop 
Accreditation” to Boost Cross-Border Trade, ISO (Nov. 15, 2004), http://www.iso.org/iso/home/ 
news_index/news_archive/news.htm?refid=Ref941 (describing the conformity assessment). 
257. See Accreditation of Third-Party Auditors/Certification Bodies to Conduct Food Safety 
Audits and to Issue Certifications, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,782, 45,802, 45,829 (proposed July 29, 2013) 
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 1, 16) (proposed § 1.624 requires a recognized accreditation body 
to take certain steps to safeguard against conflicts of interest, including implementing a written 
conflict of interest program, while proposed § 1.624(c) requires the recognized accreditation body 
to make information on the timing of payments available on its website, creating transparency, 
thereby lending to the credibility of the program). 
258. See id. at 45,819 (proposed § 1.664). 
259. See Demski, supra note 230, at 56–57. 
260. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., THIRD-PARTY AUDITOR/CERTIFICATION BODY 
ACCREDITATION FOR FOOD SAFETY AUDITS 12 (2015), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/ 
GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformation/UCM455331.pdf. 
261. See id. at 14–15 (discussing proposed §§ 1.657(a)(1)–(a)(4)). 
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food safety nongovernmental organizations,262 as well as with networks 
of regulators and nongovernmental public health organizations.  
Moreover, the FDA has held public meetings in which many of these 
organizations were present, thereby cutting against the argument that 
the FDA omits nongovernmental organization input.263  Other concerns 
drawn from the environmental context—audit teams and too little time 
were devoted to assessing performance, the poor standards enforcement, 
and a lack of oversight of the certifying bodies by the system itself264—
are not addressed by the FSMA.265 
The food industry also contains certain built-in safeguards to counter 
concerns that a lack of independence arises when auditing firms provide 
their clients with additional “non-audit” consulting and tax services.266  
Unlike the finance sector, this problem is not nearly as severe with food 
certification.  In fact, most GFSI-benchmarked schemes (e.g., SQF, 
PrimusGFS, Global Aquaculture Alliance, GlobalGAP, and IFS 
PACsecure) provide only auditing and certification services, in addition 
to some ancillary services to support those primary services.  Some 
schemes provide only certification services (e.g., Global Aquaculture 
Alliance and IFS PACsecure), while other schemes provide certification 
services plus consulting to help clients achieve certification (e.g., SQF), 
or certification plus an “add-on” certification for workers’ health, 
safety, and welfare (e.g., GlobalGAP).267  There is one exception.  The 
only scheme that provides a greater variety of services, suggesting the 
possibility of a conflict of interest, is PrimusGFS, which is owned by 
Azzule Systems.268  Azzule Systems provides data collection services 
 
262. See Food Safety, supra note 141 (citing food safety nongovernmental organizations: the 
Association of Food and Drug Officials, the Association of Public Health Laboratories, the 
Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists, the International Association of Food 
Protection, the International Food Protection Training Institute, and the National Environmental 
Health Association). 
263. The FDA is a member of several of these organizations.  The International Food 
Protection Training Institute was an FDA grant recipient in 2011.  Assisting the Integrated Food 
Safety System’s National Food/Feed Training Program, GRANTS.GOV (July 12, 2011), 
http://www.grants.gov/web/grants/view-opportunity.html?oppId=104573. 
264. See GREENPEACE ET AL., supra note 233. 
265. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 260 (noting proposed § 1.642(a)(1)). 
266. See Houghton & Jubb, supra note 229, at 308–09. 
267. See, e.g., SQF INST., http://www.sqfi.com (last visited Mar. 20, 2016) (providing 
auditing and certification services and consulting to help clients (suppliers) achieve SQF); 
GLOBAL AQUACULTURE ALLIANCE, http://gaalliance.org (last visited Mar. 20, 2016) (providing 
“Best Aquaculture Practices Certification”); GLOBALG.A.P., http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/ 
(last visited Mar. 20, 2016) (providing food safety certification and an “add-on” certification for 
workers’ health, safety, and welfare); PAC.CA, http://www.pac.ca/pacsecure.html (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2016) (providing only certification services). 
268. PRIMUSGFS, http://www.primusgfs.com (last visited Mar. 20, 2016). 
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developed for laboratory data, quality assurance data, audit data, audit 
scheme management, document management, and supply chain 
management data.  For this scheme, presumably if a supplier purchases 
certification services from PrimusGFS, other services provided by 
Azzule Systems may be at stake.  Perhaps the FSMA rules could 
stipulate that auditors should not perform other outside services for their 
clients to avoid this concern. 
Overreliance on the “Checklist” Mentality.  There is a concern that 
auditors rely on “checklists” and “one-time visits.”  The fear is that 
much could be missed—for instance, in the 2009 Salmonella in Peanuts 
outbreak, legal records show that Salmonella had been present in PCA 
peanuts as early as 2007.  While Powell and others emphasize that 
instilling and enhancing a food safety culture is the most important 
thing companies can do, they do also note that: 
Third-party audits are only one performance indicator and need to be 
supplemented with microbial testing, second-party audits of suppliers 
and the in-house capacity to meaningfully assess the results of audits 
and inspections.  Any and all raw product suppliers should be included 
in the audit scope.  More effective audit systems incorporate 
unannounced visits along with supplemental information into their 
framework . . . .269 
How does the FSMA respond to these apparent problems?  The 
FSMA rules on audit protocols contain some of these recommendations 
to rein in the “checklist mentality.”  Particularly, the rules require that 
audit scope is provided in the auditor report.270  Further, the audit must 
include supplemental information outside the audit itself, such as 
“records . . . [the site’s] process(es), and the food that results from such 
process(es)[,] . . . environmental or product sampling and analysis,” and 
“any other activities necessary to establish compliance.”271  Most 
importantly, the FSMA requires unannounced audits.  An auditor is 
required to obtain a thirty-day operating schedule for the facility so that 
he can fulfill the statutory requirement to do unannounced audits.272  
The rule specifies how an unannounced audit must be conducted, 
“focus[ing] on the highest food safety risk(s) associated with the 
 
269. Powell et al., supra note 237, at 689. 
270. See Accreditation of Third-Party Auditors/Certification Bodies to Conduct Food Safety 
Audits and to Issue Certifications, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,782, 45812 (proposed July 29, 2013) (to be 
codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 1, 16) (proposed § 1.652 requires audit scope, in line with ISO/IEC 
17021:2011, clause 9.1.10.2). 
271. Id. at 45,833 (proposed § 1.651(c)(2)). 
272. Id. at 45,832 (proposed § 1.651(b)(1)).  This is so the auditor can fulfill section 
808(c)(5)(C)(i) of the Food Drug and Cosmetics Act “unannounced” food safety audits. 
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facility, its process(es), and food within the scope of the audit.”273 
Evidence shows that the FDA considered several private standards in 
developing the audit protocols, including the unannounced audit 
protocol used by the British Retail Consortium, or BRC.274  In fact, the 
FSMA rules closely follow, but differ from, the BRC scheme policies 
for unannounced facility visits.275 
Under the BRC scheme, an unannounced audit takes place only after 
a record of high scores on announced audits and may be conducted in 
two parts—first with a records review (planned visit) and then with a 
facility audit (unannounced visit).  The BRC audit protocol allows for 
the unannounced audit to occur before a planned records review; 
however, the FDA will conduct an unannounced facility audit only after 
a planned visit.  While it is possible that the FDA sequences the visits in 
this way to be able to attain information to conduct the site audit, it is 
possible that viewing the records may subconsciously influence the 
review.  Another issue is that a thirty-day schedule of operations is 
provided—giving the audit team an opportunity to sufficiently plan the 
audit. 
The FSMA rules do not require a certain number of adequate 
unannounced audits before audits can be announced or vice versa.  
GFSI has discussed this possibility, or alternatively, the option of at 
least defining a minimum number of unannounced audits in a given 
cycle.276  This could be something that all GFSI schemes are required to 
do in the future and something that the FSMA rules could implement in 
the future as well. 
Auditor Incompetence.  Previous outbreaks such as the one involving 
PCA peanuts have pointed to auditor incompetence as a prominent food 
safety regulation concern.  In that case, the auditor was not qualified to 
audit peanut facilities.  In the case of the 2011 Colorado Listeria 
outbreak, the auditor was young and inexperienced.  How does the 
FSMA plan to address these shortcomings with third-party certification? 
 
273. Id. at 45,833 (proposed § 1.651(c)(1)). 
274. See id. at 45,788. 
275. Press Release, SGS, Unannounced Audits: A Guide to the New BRC Requirements 
(Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.sgs.com/en/Our-Company/News-and-Media-Center/News-and-Press 
-Releases/2013/11/Unannounced-Audits-A-Guide-to-the-New-BRC-Requirements.aspx (noting 
the BRC Global Standard for Food Safety requires: “that a company achieved either a Grade A or 
B on its last audit, and opted for the [u]nannounced option [where the entire audit is conducted 
unannounced] within three months of their last certification).  There is a second option for a 
partially unannounced audit where the Good Manufacturing Practice or factory processes audit is 
unannounced while the systems audit is conducted as a planned and arranged audit.  Id. 
276. See Accreditation of Third-Party Auditors/Certification Bodies to Conduct Food Safety 
Audits and to Issue Certifications, 78 Fed. Reg. at 45,833 (proposed § 1.651(c)(1)). 
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According to FSMA, “a third-party auditor can be a foreign 
government, an agency of a foreign government, a foreign cooperative, 
or any other third-party.”277  It must also meet standards for “legal 
authority, competency, capacity, conflicts of interest, quality assurance, 
and records” procedures.278  Before assigning an auditor to conduct a 
particular food safety audit, the agent must be deemed qualified to 
conduct the audit considering the scope and purpose of the audit and the 
type of facility, its processes, and type of food.279 
Thus, the proposed FSMA rules contain standards to assure auditor 
competence, requiring further that the audit agent: has relevant 
knowledge and experience; participates in annual food safety training; 
does not have a conflict of interest; agrees to notify the accredited 
auditor or certification body of the discovery of “any condition that 
could cause or contribute to a serious risk to the public health”; and has 
not performed an audit on that facility in the last thirteen months (with 
some exceptions).280  Before assigning an auditor to conduct a 
particular food safety audit, the agent must be deemed qualified to 
conduct the audit considering the scope and purpose of the audit and the 
type of facility, its processes, and the type of food.281  This mechanism 
directly addresses the PCA Salmonella outbreak where the auditor did 
not have an expertise in inspecting peanut operations. 
Nonetheless, there are several downsides to the way in which the 
FSMA rules address auditor competence.  While the FDA’s “Guidance 
for Industry” report provides details on these standards,282 one critique 
of this guidance is that the document requires food safety experience but 
only provides “recommendations” (not requirements) on qualifications 
and training for auditors including coursework and field training.283  
Another critique is that even though the FSMA third-party auditor 
requirements284 largely mirror those of GFSI,285 the standards found in 
 
277. Id. at 45,807. 
278. Id. (emphasis added); see also Voluntary Third-Party Certification Programs for Foods 
and Feeds, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/regulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm125431.htm#VB (last 
updated Jan. 25, 2016). 
279. See Accreditation of Third-Party Auditors/Certification Bodies to Conduct Food Safety 
Audits and to Issue Certifications, 78 Fed. Reg. at 45,832 (proposed § 1.650(a–b)). 
280. Id. (proposed § 1.650(a)(5)). 
281. Id. (proposed § 1.650(a–b)). 
282. See generally U.S FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 260. 
283. Powell et al., supra note 237, at 689. 
284. See Accreditation of Third-Party Auditors/Certification Bodies to Conduct Food Safety 
Audits and to Issue Certifications, 78 Fed. Reg. at 45808. 
285. GLOBAL FOOD SAFETY INITIATIVE, EXPLAINING THE GFSI AUDITOR COMPETENCE 
SCHEME 2 (2014), http://www.mygfsi.com/gfsifiles/information-kit/GFSI_Auditor_Competence_ 
Workstream_Information_Package_ed1_August_2014.pdf (noting that the GFSI auditor 
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GFSI-benchmarked schemes are more rigorous.  For instance, under 
GFSI-benchmarked schemes, a separate business entity registers food 
safety auditors based on knowledge examination and skills assessment, 
and manages an integrity program. 286  A similar requirement is not 
found in the FSMA. 
No Requirement to Disclose.  One peril with not requiring firms to 
disclose food safety breaches immediately is that they will escape 
reprimand thereby compromising the food safety culture.  The FSMA 
rules alter this.  The FSMA rules stipulate that the auditor agree to 
immediately notify the accredited auditor or certification body of 
discovery of “any condition that could cause or contribute to a serious 
risk to the public health,”287 and in turn, the auditor or certification 
body must immediately notify the FDA of such condition.288 
Mismanaging Third-Party Certifiers.  In our earlier privacy example, 
TRUSTe had failed to conduct annual recertifications of companies 
holding TRUSTe privacy seals.  The FSMA has a policy to require 
annual recertifications.  According to the FSMA, recertification is 
required prior to expiration of its certification, and the FDA may require 
an eligible entity to renew a food certification at any time it determines 
appropriate.289  In addition, the FDA may, at any time, “conduct an 
onsite audit of an eligible entity that has received food or facility 
certification,”290 and if the certifier does not meet its responsibilities, 
the FDA can revoke its recognition.291 
B.  Future Directions 
In the future, the FDA will administer the FSMA and importers of 
FDA-regulated foods will have to attest that those foods comply with 
the FSMA rules.  While some products will require third-party 
certification (e.g., high risk foods and producers belonging to the 
Voluntary Qualified Importer Program), for most suppliers, third-party 
certification will be voluntary.  Certification will be provided by FDA-
approved, third-party certifiers who are, in turn, certified by FDA-
 
competence scheme has four components: (1) competencies, (2) knowledge examination, (3) 
skills assessment, and (4) GFSA foundation—a business entity, separate and apart from GFSI, 
that will register food safety auditors based on knowledge examinations and skills assessment, 
register skills assessors, and manage an integrity program). 
286. See id. 
287. See Accreditation of Third-Party Auditors/Certification Bodies to Conduct Food Safety 
Audits and to Issue Certifications, 78 Fed. Reg. at 45,832 (proposed § 1.650(a)(5)). 
288. See id. at 45,835 (proposed § 1.656(c)). 
289. Id. at 45,821 (discussing proposed § 1.681(a–b)). 
290. Id. at 45,838 (proposed § 1.680). 
291. Id. at 45,804 (discussing proposed § 1.634). 
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approved accredited bodies.292 
Although much remains uncertain, two trends provide a glimpse into 
what a New Governance paradigm for food safety may grow up to look 
like.  First, as previously discussed, third-party certification has the 
potential to reduce an industry’s regulatory burden.  Part II.A discussed 
the opportunities related to third-party certification, and mentioned how 
third-party certification had the potential to reduce regulatory burden.  
Second, as noted earlier, in 2006, the FDA and Health Canada initiated 
the pilot Multipurpose Audit Program.293  The pilot explored the 
potential benefits to medical device manufacturers and the two agencies 
of using a single third party for audits and inspections to simultaneously 
meet FDA and Health Canada regulatory requirements for systems 
quality.294  The results showed that a joint approach eased the 
regulatory burden by reducing the time spent conducting separate FDA 
and Health Canada audits and inspections.295  In addition, the FDA and 
Health Canada gained a better understanding of their respective auditing 
and inspection approaches, providing a foundation for leveraging 
resources in the future.296 
If one can foresee private third-party auditors conducting FDA and 
Health Canada inspections, one could foresee these auditors conducting 
FDA, Health Canada, and EU inspections, and so forth.  This is similar 
to the way in which private third parties conduct inspections for the 
various GFSI-benchmarked schemes.  In the end, the schemes are 
benchmarked: “once certified, accepted everywhere.”297 
Canada and the United States are negotiating similar food safety 
standards: accrediting the same accreditation bodies who will in turn 
certify third-party auditors to certify producers using the Canada 
standard or the U.S. standard in the same way that that GFSI-
benchmarked schemes are interchanged today. 
C.  Addressing Legitimacy 
The problem that private schemes lack international legitimacy in a 
global marketplace has been raised repeatedly.  There are two principal 
 
292. Sharon Mayl, Senior Advisor for Policy, Office of Foods & Veterinary Med., Addressing 
FSMA—Proposed Rules—Third Party Accreditation (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.fda.gov/ 
downloads/InternationalPrograms/NewsEvents/UCM392450.pdf. 




297. What is GFSI, GFSI, http://www.mygfsi.com/about-us/about-gfsi/what-is-gfsi.html (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2016). 
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arguments—the first centers on the WTO rules themselves and the 
second focuses on the “essence” of the WTO rules.   
First, GFSI schemes and other private food safety schemes are 
criticized for creating unjustified and unnecessary barriers to 
international trade, particularly for developing countries.298  The issue 
of private standards was raised by St. Vincent and the Grenadines in 
2005 when they opposed the operation of the EureGAP scheme used by 
supermarkets in the United Kingdom.  Concerned about the negative 
impact on its banana exports of EureGAP standards for pesticides, St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines raised a “specific trade concern” in the 
WTO on this issue and the SPS Committee issued reports in 2007 and 
2008.299  The European Union, following a prevailing sentiment shared 
by developing countries on the issue, denied WTO applicability beyond 
public standards.  It rejected the complaint by stating that it was only 
about a private standard required by a private retailer and did not 
concern any official requirement of the European Union. 
And yet, developing countries have a valid argument, despite the fact 
that private standards were developed after the negotiation of WTO 
agreements.  The SPS Agreement applies to “all sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures which may, directly or indirectly, affect 
international trade.”300  A threshold issue is whether this definition 
includes only government actions and whether it excludes measures 
imposed by private standards or by the private sector.  Beyond this, 
Article 13 states: “Members shall take such reasonable measures as may 
be available to them to ensure that non-governmental entities within 
their territories . . . comply with the relevant provisions of this 
Agreement.”301  Developing countries interpret this Article as 
applicable to private standards.  From this, it appears that the 
 
298. See Comm. on Sanitary & Phytosanitary Measures, Report by the Commonwealth of the 
Bahamas to the WTO-SPS Committee on Private Standards and the SPS Agreement: The 
Bahamas Experience, WTO Doc. G/SPS/GEN/764 (Feb. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Bahamas 
Report]; Comm. on Sanitary & Phytosanitary Measures, Private Industry Standards: 
Communication from Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, WTO Doc. G/SPS/GEN/766 (Feb. 28, 
2007); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Trade and Development Report, 
2007, at iii, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/TDR/2007 (Sept. 5, 2007); United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, Food Safety and Environmental Requirements in Export Markets—
Friend or Foe for Producers of Fruit and Vegetables in Asian Developing Countries?, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/DITC/TED/2006/8 (2007). 
299. See Private Standards, supra note 22; see also Comm. on Sanitary & Phytosanitary 
Measures, Considerations Relevant to Private Standards in the Field of Animal Health, Food 
Safety and Animal Welfare, Submission by the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), 
WTO Doc. G/SPS/GEN/822 (Feb. 25, 2008) [hereinafter Animal Health]. 
300. SPS Agreement, supra note 17, at art. 1. 
301. Id. at art. 13. 
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relationship between Article 13 and private standard-setting bodies 
hinges upon the definition of “non-governmental entities,” a term not 
defined in the SPS Agreement.  Here, I simply identify the current 
debate and suggest that the distinction between private standard-setting 
body and nongovernmental entity is ripe for future investigation. 
The second argument focuses on the “essence” of WTO law.  The 
WTO and others have said that private standards are based on a “non-
scientific, zero-risk, marketing approach” and would therefore 
contravene international trade rules (in theory).302  In addition, private 
schemes are criticized for prescribing production and processing 
methods that are inappropriate and insensitive to local economic, social, 
religious, and cultural contexts, and stand against what states committed 
to under WTO membership.303  Finally, the private standard-setting 
procedures have been criticized for lacking transparency, being 
undemocratic, and for violating notions of fairness.304 
With growing use of private standards, legitimacy is a real concern.  
While a solution to legitimacy rests outside the focus of this Article, 
Mark Suchman’s theory based on pragmatic, moral, and cognitive 
legitimacy, and Christine Parker and John Braithwaite’s thoughts on the 
significance of maintaining legitimacy could be used to ground 
legitimacy arguments on several descriptive foundations.305  In terms of 
specific steps, with respect to co-regulation in the Internet law context, 
Weiser promotes strengthening co-regulatory legitimacy through 
government oversight, using an established co-regulator, drawing upon 
expertise in that community, and operating in a transparent, effective, 
timely, and fair manner.306  
CONCLUSION 
This Article shows how, in an era with growing international 
commitments, traditional command-and-control regulation does not 
provide countries with the regulatory space to raise food safety 
standards.  Countries are turning to New Governance approaches as the 
 
302. Animal Health, supra note 299; see also Bahamas Report, supra note 298. 
303. See Animal Health, supra note 299; see also Bahamas Report, supra note 298. 
304. Hugh Campbell, The Rise and Rise of EurepGAP: European (Re)Invention of Colonial 
Food Relations?, 13 INT’L J. SOC. FOOD & AGRIC. 1 (2005); see also Holcomb et al., supra note 
111 (noting that Wal-Mart announced corporate-wide efforts to have fresh produce suppliers 
follow the Produce Traceability Initiative protocol instituting a “100% money back” guarantee on 
freshness by 2014, with exemptions for small farms). 
305. Parker & Braithwaite, supra note 142; Mark C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: 
Strategic and Institutional Approaches, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 571 (1995). 
306. See Weiser, supra note 218. 
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only way to raise food safety standards.  This Article addresses this 
tension and challenges command-and-control regulation and traditional 
global governance in the food safety arena, and goes beyond that to 
provide a glimpse into a future for food safety governance.  According 
to the FDA, it plans to “allocate agency resources based on risk, 
leveraging the combined efforts of government, industry, and public- 
and private-sector third parties.”307  The future, I suggest, is for 
countries to (1) raise food safety standards by borrowing the practice of 
using third-party certification from private standards (admittedly, 
controversial within the WTO), such as GFSI-benchmarked schemes, to 
expand public-private partnerships, while (2) continuing to pursue 
bilateral system recognition agreements (sanctioned by the WTO).  
These two avenues have the potential to raise food safety standards 
from the baseline to “SPS-plus” or to “SPS-plus plus” levels.  
Ultimately, by pursuing these two avenues, we could collaborate 
further, on a country-by-country basis, to share certification resources.  
As noted earlier, pilot studies have revealed efficiencies from using a 
single third party for audits and inspections to simultaneously meet U.S. 
(FDA) and Canadian (Health Canada) regulatory requirements for 
systems quality.  
And yet, even if the United States were to adopt New Governance 
features, the benefits of adopting New Governance also come with 
potential pitfalls, both in terms of implementation and with respect to 
legitimacy.  For instance, with respect to the conflict-of-interest 
concern, third-party auditors are not barred from working in-house for 
their clients, and auditors are not prevented from performing other 
services for their auditees.  Nonetheless, I suggest that these concerns, 
and others, could be addressed with more legislative authority or 
guidance.  The “checklist mentality” could be addressed by requiring a 
certain number of unannounced visits as is being considered by GFSI.  
Auditors could achieve competence if they were required to complete 
certain defined coursework and field training instead of fulfilling 
recommendations.   
Practically speaking, many of the implementation issues can find 
remedies in legislative authority and guidance.  The larger concern, 
however, beyond remedying the common shortcomings of New 
Governance, is legitimacy.  While remaining beyond the scope of this 
Article, the use of private standards is controversial among many who 
 
307. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PATHWAY TO GLOBAL PRODUCT SAFETY AND QUALITY 4 
(2011), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/aboutfda/centersoffices/officeofglobalregulatoryoperation 
sandpolicy/globalproductpathway/ucm262528.pdf. 
15_MARKS FINAL .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/1/2016  12:58 PM 
968 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  47 
feel that country use of private standards undermines the tenants and 
values of WTO membership.  Without legitimacy, it is possible that 
countries will remain at the SPS-default or SPS-plus food safety 
standards levels and may be unable to reach the “top shelf,” the SPS-
plus plus standard. 
 
